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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the world was shocked when thirteen-year-old Megan Meier
committed suicide after being told that the world would be better off without her
by a fake user on the social networking platform Myspace.1 This was neither the
first nor the last suicide attributed to cyberbullying,2 and although suicide remains
an infrequent outcome, its salience has called attention to the pervasiveness and
gravity of technology-facilitated bullying among adolescents. Unfortunately, the law
has failed to provide a satisfactory response. This Article aims to fill the gap,
providing a law and economics analysis of the different models of civil liability for
cyberbullying. It acknowledges three categories of potential defendants (see Figure
1): (1) the juvenile wrongdoers, (2) real-life supervisors (parents, school personnel),
and (3) virtual supervisors (such as social networking platforms). It systematically
analyzes the legal rules delineating each party’s liability and evaluates the alternatives
from an economic perspective. The Article demonstrates that technological
innovation not only generates new risks or exacerbates old ones, but also simplifies
the construction of efficient liability models to control them. In the context of
juvenile bullying, imposing liability on real-life supervisors may be an inevitable
solution to the fundamental inefficiencies of primary wrongdoers’ liability.3 Alas,
supervisors’ liability in the digital age entails considerable information costs.
Technology, which has transformed an old schoolyard problem into a cyberspace
pandemic, now provides the tools to substantially reduce these costs. It facilitates
the collection, analysis, and flow of information, thereby reducing the cost of
preventive action. Liability rules can and should endorse these developments in an
effort to secure efficient conduct of all parties involved.

1. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html [ https://perma.cc/
P7TL-BSAK ].
2. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Felony Counts for 2 in Suicide of Bullied 12-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/felony-charges-for-2-girls-in-suicide-ofbullied-12-year-old-rebecca-sedwick.html [ https://perma.cc/G9LU-L8P6 ] (discussing Rebecca
Sedwick’s suicide); see also Nicole P. Grant, Mean Girls and Boys: The Intersection of Cyberbullying and
Privacy Law and Its Social-Political Implications, 56 HOW. L.J. 169, 185–88 (2012) (discussing suicide
cases); Shira Auerbach, Note, Screening Out Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet Playground,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1641, 1641–42 (2009) (same); Emily Poole, Note, Hey Girls, Did You Know?
Slut-Shaming on the Internet Needs to Stop, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 221, 236–39 (2013) (same); Tiffany Sumrall,
Comment, Lethal Words: Harmful Impact of Cyberbullying and the Need for Federal Criminalization, 53
HOUS. L. REV. 1475, 1480–81 (2016) (same).
3. E.g., Benjamin Walther, Comment, Cyberbullying: Holding Grownups Liable for Negligent
Entrustment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 531, 534 (2012) (presenting the negligent-entrustment theory of liability
for cyberbullying cases).
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Figure 1. Interaction and Information Flow
Almost all adolescents in the United States currently have Internet access,4
most have smartphones,5 and a majority of teenagers with web-access also have
personal profiles on social networking platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram,
Tumblr, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube.6 Regrettably, electronic devices and
applications are increasingly used to transmit and disseminate harmful content,
especially among teens. This harmful conduct can take various forms, from sending
personal insults and threats, through the publication or sharing of embarrassing or
humiliating texts, photographs, and videos, to organizing social boycotts and
inciting real-life harassment.7 It may be carried out through text messaging, instant
messaging, electronic mail, social networks, blog and forum posts, online comments
and reviews, and the like.8 When such conduct is intentional, repeated, and involves
a real or perceived power imbalance, it is generally referred to as “cyberbullying,”9
although the term is rarely used in the context of adult cyber-harassment or
cyber-stalking.10 Studies on both sides of the Atlantic show that one-third to fifty
4. See Grant, supra note 2, at 178 (reporting 87% access rate in 2010); Mary-Rose Papandrea,
Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2008) (reporting 87% internet
access rate in 2004); Poole, supra note 2, at 226 (reporting 95% general access rate and 75% mobile
access rate in 2013).
5. See Poole, supra note 2, at 226.
6. Grant, supra note 2, at 178–79.
7. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., What Is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV,
http://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it/index.html
[ https://perma.cc/5YG3HDW5 ] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2020 ) (“Cyberbullying includes sending, posting, or sharing negative,
harmful, false, or mean content about someone else. It can include sharing personal or private
information about someone else causing embarrassment or humiliation.”).
8. Id.
9. Id. (defining “cyberbullying” as “bullying that takes place over digital devices”); U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., What Is Bullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, https://www.stopbullying.gov/
what-is-bullying/index.html [ https://perma.cc/T84D-7UDD ] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2020 ) (defining
“bullying” as “unwanted, aggressive behavior among school aged children that involves a real or
perceived power imbalance” and is “repeated, or has the potential to be repeated, over time”); see also
Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMS and E-Mails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be
Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 16–19 (2010)
(defining cyberbullying); Kathleen Conn, Best Practices in Bullying Prevention: One Size Does Not Fit
All, 22 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 393, 393, 402 (2013) (same); Grant, supra note 2, at 183 (same); Peter
K. Smith et al., Cyberbullying: Its Nature and Impact in Secondary School Pupils, 49 J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 376, 376 (2008) (same); Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643 (same).
10. Calvert, supra note 9, at 18–19.
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percent of teens suffer from cyberbullying, many of them regularly.11 Not only are
these practices more common among minors, but they are also more harmful to
minors who are in greater need of social acceptance.12
Cyberbullying may cause annoyance, anxiety, fright, embarrassment,
humiliation, lowered self-esteem, and distress, and may even lead to social disorders,
psychological disorders, and occasionally suicide attempts.13 A recent medical
review article concluded that juvenile victims of cyberbullying are twice as likely as
non-victims to cause self-harm and exhibit suicidal ideation and behavior.14
Cyberbullying may be more severe than traditional bullying, because (1) it can be
carried out effortlessly and instantly;15 (2) it has a much wider potential reach,
increasing expected impact;16 (3) it can transcend the temporal and spatial
boundaries of school activity;17 (4) the harmful speech may be harsher, because
perpetrators behind a screen are not restrained by victims’ facial and bodily
expressions of harm and bystanders’ expressions of indignation;18 (5) technology
facilitates anonymity, which encourages unconstrained speech by shielding
perpetrators from embarrassment, reprimand, and retaliation;19 (6) offensive speech
cannot be easily removed, particularly when disseminated through various media;20
and (7) juvenile online speech cannot be easily overseen by adults.21 Apart from its
effects on victims, juvenile cyberbullying has negative effects on perpetrators, who

11. E.g., A THIN LINE, 2009 AP-MTV DIGITAL ABUSE STUDY 1–2 (n.d.), http://
www.athinline.org/MTV-AP_Digital_Abuse_Study_Executive_Summary.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/
7SFN-V7ZU ] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2020 ) (reporting 50% victimization rate in the US); DITCH THE
LABEL, THE ANNUAL BULLYING SURVEY 2017, at 15 (5th ed. 2017), https://www.ditchthelabel.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The-Annual-Bullying-Survey-2017-1.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7Q9SWVM3 ] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2019 ) (reporting that 33% of UK teens experience cyberbullying often to
constantly); Grant, supra note 2, at 178, 184 (reporting near 42%); Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643
(reporting 75%); Amanda Lenhart, Cyberbullying, PEW RES. CTR. ( June 27, 2007), http://
www.pewinternet.org/2007/06/27/cyberbullying [ https://perma.cc/5DCA-YTSD ] (reporting 32%).
12. Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online
Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 851–52 (2010).
13. See Conn, supra note 9, at 396–97; Duffy B. Trager, New Tricks for Old Dogs: The Tinker
Standard Applied to Cyber-Bullying, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 553, 556 (2009); King, supra note 12, at 850–51.
14. Ann John et al., Self-Harm, Suicidal Behaviours, and Cyberbullying in Children and Young
People: Systematic Review, 20 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 129 passim (2018); see also Sameer Hinduja
& Justin W. Patchin, Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Suicide, 14 ARCHIVES SUICIDE RES. 206, 206 (2010)
(finding a link between suicidal ideation and cyberbullying).
15. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643; Poole, supra note 2, at 243–44.
16. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643; Poole, supra note 2, at 243–44.
17. Calvert, supra note 9, at 14–16, 20; Poole, supra note 2, at 244–45; Sumrall, supra note 2, at
1479; Walther, supra note 3, at 534.
18. Calvert, supra note 9, at 20; Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1644; Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1479.
19. Calvert, supra note 9, at 20; Grant, supra note 2, at 173–74, 198–99; Auerbach, supra note 2,
at 1643–45; King, supra note 12, at 852; Poole, supra note 2, at 243, 259; Sumrall, supra note 2, at
1479–80.
20. Poole, supra note 2, at 244.
21. Id.
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are more prone to criminal activity and antisocial behavior,22 and on bystanders,
who are exposed to greater mental risks.23
The most common legal response to cyberbullying is delegating the
responsibility to school boards.24 All state legislatures in the United States require
school districts to prescribe and enforce anti-bullying policies,25 and many explicitly
apply these rules to cyberbullying.26 While similar in principle, state statutes differ
in various respects, including the definition of bullying and the degree of

22. Conn, supra note 9, at 397–99; Susan M. Swearer & Shelley Hymel, Understanding the
Psychology of Bullying: Moving Toward a Social-Ecological Diathesis–Stress Model, 70
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 344, 347 (2015) (presenting impact on perpetrators).
23. Conn, supra note 9, at 399–402.
24. Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A
Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment
Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2011); Walther, supra note 3, at 539.
25. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to 16-28B-9 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200 (2006);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(36) (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(d)–(f) (2019);
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.4 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 10-222d(b)–(c) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4164(a)–(b) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(2), (4)
(2019); GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-751.4(b) (2016); HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-6 (LexisNexis 2009); IDAHO
CODE § 33-1631 (2019); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 27-23.7 (2017); IND. CODE § 20-33-8-13.5(a) (2018);
IOWA CODE § 280.28(3) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6147(b)–(c) (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
158.148(5) (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(A)–(B) (2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, §
1001(15) (2019); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1(b)(1)–(2) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71,
§ 37O(b), (d)(1)–(2) (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1310b(1) (2017); MINN. STAT.
§ 121A.031 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67(2) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775(1) (2016);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-209 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2,137(3) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 388.133 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4(II) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(a), (b)
(West 2012); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.6 (2019); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 13 (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-407.15(b), (d) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-18 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.666(B) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4(A) (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(1)
(2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A(a) (2008); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34 (2011) (imposing
the duty on the state department of education); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-140(A), (B) (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-14 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4503(a) (2019); TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 37.001(a)(7) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-9-605(1)–(3) (LexisNexis 2019); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 165(a)(8) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-279.6(D), 22.1-291.4(A) (2019); WASH. REV.
CODE § 28A.600.477(1)(a) (2018); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3(a)–(b) (2011); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2019);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-314(a) (2009).
26. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(b)(2) (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d(a)(2) (2018);
FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(3)(a) (2019); GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-751.4(a) (2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5
/ 27-23.7(b) (2017); IOWA CODE § 280.28(2)(b) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6147(a)(2) (2013);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(C)(1)(b) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O(a) (2014); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 380.1310b(10)(b)–(c) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 121A.031(a)(2)–(3) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. §
37-11-67(1) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775(2) (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-208(1) (2015);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2,137(2) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.133(1) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§
193-F:4(II) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15.1(b) (West 2012); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7(a)–(b)
(2019); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11(7)–(8) (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.15(a) (2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666(A)(2)(a) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4(A)(1) (2016);
OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(2)(a) (2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A(e) (2008); 16 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 16-21-33(a)(1) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4503(a) (2019); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53G-9605(3)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11(a)(32) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1279.6(A) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.477(5)(b)(ii) (2018).
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particularity.27 A less frequent legal response, which raises serious freedom of
speech concerns,28 is criminalization of the harmful conduct. Legislators and
scholars advocated federal criminalization of cyberbullying following Megan Meier’s
suicide, but these attempts ultimately failed.29 A few state legislatures have already
criminalized cyberbullying,30 but these criminal statutes typically apply to extreme
subsets of this phenomenon, such as cyberstalking.31 Cases involving threats of
violence may also be covered by specific federal legislation.32 In theory,
cyberbullying resulting in suicide may be considered homicide,33 although causation
may be difficult to establish.34
A third possible response—namely civil liability—is rarely considered, hence
undertheorized. There have been few civil lawsuits for real-life bullying,35 and even
less reported attempts to sue for cyberbullying.36 In Finkel v. Dauber,37 members of
27. Conn, supra note 9, at 419–24 (discussing state anti-bullying legislation); Mathew Fenn,
Note, A Web of Liability: Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put Public Schools in Sticky Situation?, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2754–55 (2013) (same).
28. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822 (N.C. 2016) (finding the criminalization of
online publication of “private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor” unconstitutional);
People v. Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (N.Y. 1989) (holding a criminal proscription of abusive speech
with intent to harass unconstitutional hence invalid).
29. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009), https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1966ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr1966ih.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/
K85N-QWLH ] (imposing criminal penalties on “whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce
any communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress
to a person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior”). For more
information about this bill, see Grant, supra note 2, at 201; Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1477, 1499–1500;
and Walther, supra note 3, at 534, 536–37.
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(4)(h)(i) (2019); IDAHO
CODE § 18-917A(2) (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney
2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2012), invalidated in part by State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822
(N.C. 2016).
31. Walther, supra note 3, at 537.
32. Federal law penalizes threats to injure transmitted over interstate lines, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
(2018), and electronic stalking which places the victim in a fear of serious injury or death or causes
substantial emotional distress, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018).
33. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 570 (Mass. 2019) (“[A] person might be
charged with involuntary manslaughter for reckless or wanton conduct, including verbal conduct,
causing a victim to commit suicide.”); Audrey Rogers, Death by Bullying: A Comparative Culpability
Proposal, 35 PACE L. REV. 343, 365 (2014) (“For egregious bullying cases, prosecutors can and should
consider possible homicide charges.”).
34. See Nicholas LaPalme, Note, Michelle Carter and the Curious Case of Causation: How to
Respond to a Newly Emerging Class of Suicide-Related Proceedings, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1443, 1446–53 (2018)
(discussing the causation hurdle in prosecuting encouragement of suicide).
35. Tracy Tefertiller, Out of the Principal’s Office and Into the Courtroom: How Should California
Approach Criminal Remedies for School Bullying?, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 168, 189 (2011); see, e.g., Doe
v. Bristol Bd. of Educ., No. CV065002257, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3508 (Mar. 23, 2007); Jasperson
v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. A06-1904, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1071
(Oct. 30, 2007).
36. See D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, rev. denied, No. S181558, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 6052 ( June
17, 2010); Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Draker v. Schreiber, 271
S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App. 2008).
37. Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d. 697.
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a Facebook group run by New York adolescents posted defamatory statements
about their school peer, claiming that she contracted HIV by having sex with an
animal or a male prostitute, or by sharing a needle with a heroin addict, and
consequently “morfed [sic] into the devil.”38 The claim was dismissed.39 In
D.C. v. R.R.,40 a Los Angeles high school student was the subject of posts by fellow
students on his own website “making derogatory comments about his perceived
sexual orientation and threatening him with bodily harm.”41 The student sued, but
the only legal issue decided by the court was whether the California anti-SLAPP
statute applied (a question answered in the negative).42 The scarcity of case law may
explain why no serious attempt has been made to analyze and evaluate competing
liability theories in the legal literature.43 This reality is perplexing in light of the
general jurisprudential assumption that criminal liability, which is frequently
considered as a response to juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, is a residual system,
reserved for cases in which less stringent legal and extra-legal systems fail.44
Part I systematically discusses the law pertaining to civil liability of the three
categories of potential defendants. Section A begins with an overview of the various
causes of action that can be employed in lawsuits against cyberbullies. It identifies
the possible obstacles to primary wrongdoers’ liability on the legal, technological,
and financial levels. Section B focuses on real-life supervisors. It first examines
relevant theories of parental liability and their limits. Next, it analyzes common law
and statutory bases of school district and school personnel liability and explains the
constitutional constraints on school regulation of student conduct. Section C
discusses virtual supervisors’ liability. It shows that bringing lawsuits against virtual
supervisors for wrongful user-contributions is almost impossible under American
law and presents alternative models.
Part II evaluates the different liability regimes from an economic perspective
and constructs an efficient technologically-assisted model. Section A explains that
primary wrongdoers’ liability cannot achieve efficient deterrence because of minors’
(1) inability to compensate their victims, (2) limited cognitive, emotional, and social
capacity, and (3) frequent use of anonymity. Section B evaluates real-life supervisors’
liability, focusing on the gap between the ability to affect juvenile conduct and the
high cost of information about misconduct. Section C shows that virtual

38. Id. at 700.
39. Id. at 702. In Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 318, a claim for cyberbullying was similarly denied, but
the victim was not a minor, so the case does not squarely fall within the ambit of this article.
40. D.C., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404–05.
41. Id. at 1199.
42. Id. The acronym SLAPP stands for strategic lawsuit against public participation.
43. Noteworthy exceptions are Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies Through
Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41 (2007), and Walther, supra note 3, but each
focuses on a different defendant and neither provides comprehensive legal and economic analyses.
44. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 207 passim (2004) (discussing the principle of criminalization as a last resort); Nils Jareborg,
Criminalization as Last Resort, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 525 (2005) (same).

First to Printer_Perry.docx (Do Not Delete)

1226

5/20/20 9:49 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1219

supervisors’ liability may be inefficient due to the high cost of monitoring,
non-internalization of the vast economic benefits of Web 2.0 services by service
providers, and an asymmetry between false negative and false positive
determinations of wrongfulness. More importantly, it argues that virtual supervisors
may have some access to relevant information but lack the power to affect juvenile
conduct. Finally, Section D constructs an efficient liability model based on parental
supervision and technologically-facilitated reduction in information costs.
I. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
A. The Wrongdoer
1. Causes of Action
The obvious candidate for liability in a case of cyber-wrongdoing is the
primary wrongdoer. The first analytical step, therefore, is to identify possible causes
of action for such wrongdoing. When cyber-wrongdoing leads to actual violence,
or consists of threats thereof, an action for battery or assault may ensue.45 This,
however, is uncommon; cyberbullying is mostly a speech-based phenomenon and
should be addressed accordingly.46 No jurisdiction in the United States has hitherto
recognized a specific cause of action for cyberbullying.47 In Finkel v. Dauber, for
example, the court made clear that New York law does not “recognize cyberbullying
or Internet bullying as a cognizable tort action.”48 Of course, this does not preclude
future development of such a tort. Indeed, the legislature of the Canadian province
of Nova Scotia explicitly recognized a specific tort of cyberbullying,49 and some
scholars advocated a similar development in the United States.50 However, until this
happens, victims must rely on other causes of action.51

45. If a person “acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the
other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact” then he is liable for battery if
a harmful contact results, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965), and for
assault if the other is only “put in such imminent apprehension.” Id. § 21.
46. See Walther, supra note 3, at 542 (“Unlike the traditional bully who could be sued for assault
and battery, the cyberbully only engages in hurtful speech over the Internet.”).
47. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697, 703 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Walther, supra note 3, at 542.
48. Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
49. The first legislative recognition of a specific tort was in the Cyber-Safety Act, S.N.S. 2013,
c 2, § 21 (Can.). This Act was struck down for infringing the constitutional freedom of expression and
right to liberty. Crouch v. Snell, 2015 NSSC 340, paras. 106, 116, 137, 158, 166, 175, 184, 187, 191, 203,
207, 221 (Can. N.S.). In 2017, the Nova Scotia legislature enacted a more limited liability rule. Intimate
Images and Cyber-Protection Act, S.N.S. 2017, c 7, § 6(3) (Can.).
50. See, e.g., Jonathan Heller, Note, The Chat Room Moderator: Creating a Duty for Parents to
Control Their Cyberbully, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 165, 172 (2015) (addressing criticism of the Nova
Scotia statute).
51. This Section discusses common law causes of action. There may be state-specific statutory
causes of action. For example, in California, any person has the right to be free from “intimidation by
threat of violence” motivated by the victim’s actual or perceived disability, gender, race, religion or
sexual orientation. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7(a) (West 2019).
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If a child or an adolescent publishes disparaging statements about another
through electronic devices and applications, an action for defamation may be
appropriate. Defamation is defined as a communication that tends to “harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”52 To successfully bring a
defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant’s statement about
the plaintiff was both false and defamatory, (2) the statement was published without
privilege to a third party, (3) the defendant’s conduct involved fault (at least
negligence), and (4) the statement is actionable per se or its publication caused
special harm.53
The main obstacle here is that an action for defamation is based on a statement
of fact, not an opinion.54 Generally, opinions enjoy First Amendment protection.55
The Supreme Court highlighted this distinction in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,56
holding that a statement is one of fact, rather than mere opinion, if it is “provable
as false” and can be “reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts.”57 Thus,
imaginative expressions, rhetorical hyperboles, and conjectures, which a reasonable
audience cannot perceive as statements of fact, are not actionable.58 In Finkel
v. Dauber,59 mentioned in the Introduction, members of a teenage Facebook group
posted defamatory statements about their peer, claiming that she contracted HIV
through contemptible conduct and “morfed [sic] into the devil.”60 The court held
that group members could not be liable for defamation, because the posts could
only be read as puerile attempts by adolescents to outdo each other, not as
statements of fact.61 Similarly, in Draker v. Schreiber,62 teenage students created a
Myspace profile under their vice-principal’s name, which contained her personal
information and explicit and graphic sexual references. The vice-principal sued, and
the trial court granted the students’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the
cause of action for defamation.63 It agreed that the “exaggerated and derogatory
statements” included in the fake profile were not assertions of fact that could be
objectively verified and therefore could not be defamatory.64

52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
53. Id. § 558.
54. Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1496; Walther, supra note 3, at 544.
55. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1667.
56. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
57. Id. at 19–20.
58. Id.; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g
Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970); Catherine J. Ross, Incredible Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 377,
400–17 (2018) (discussing incredible lies in defamation law).
59. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
60. Id. at 700.
61. Id. at 702.
62. Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App. 2008).
63. Id. at 321.
64. Id.
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Another obstacle is that even defamatory statements of fact cannot be
actionable unless they are false. Truth has always been an absolute defense against
a lawsuit for defamation.65 Statements made by adolescents to harass their peers are
sometimes true, as in the unfortunate yet common event of bullying based on sexual
orientation.66 Additionally, when the harassment takes the form of private
communication between the wrongdoer and the victim, such as a personal text
message or an e-mail, the requirement of publication is not satisfied.67 Finally,
teenage victims may be unable to establish special harm.68
In many cases, cyberbullying involves public disclosure of private matters,
which is one of the recognized categories of the tort of invasion of privacy. Liability
can arise if the defendant (1) gave publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of the plaintiff, (2) the matter publicized would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (3) the matter is not of legitimate concern to the public.69 This tort
encompasses true factual statements, which the tort of defamation does not cover.
A notable example is the Tyler Clementi incident, in which a student committed
suicide after his roommate secretly streamed his sexual encounter with another
man.70 Liability can arise only if the publication would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and this requirement precludes recovery in many instances of
cyber-invasion of privacy.71 Another recognized category of invasion of privacy,
which may apply to some cases of cyber-harassment, is intrusion “upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns.”72 It may occur in the
digital rather than the physical world,73 and does not require publication of any sort.
Intrusion upon seclusion gives rise to liability if it is intentional and “highly offensive
to a reasonable person.”74
A third possible cause of action is intentional infliction of emotional distress
(hereinafter IIED). The tort requires proof of four elements: (1) extreme or
outrageous conduct, (2) intention or recklessness, (3) severe emotional harm, and
(4) a causal link between the conduct and the harm.75 As per the first requirement,
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
66. Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1496.
67. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1650, 1667.
68. Walther, supra note 3, at 545–46.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
70. Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html [ https://perma.cc/
M5GL-6LW8 ].
71. Walther, supra note 3, at 545 n.90.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
73. See, e.g., Roberts v. CareFlite, No. 02-12-00105-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8371 (Oct. 4,
2012) (suing her employer for an invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion after she was
terminated for “unprofessional and insubordinate” Facebook activity—a comment on a
friend’s post).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B; see also Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853
S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993) (endorsing § 652B).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also
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liability can be imposed only if the conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”76 While
cyberbullying may be harmful, it does not ordinarily reach this bar. The
severity-of-harm requirement may also be an insurmountable obstacle,77 especially
in the few jurisdictions that require physical harm.78 Furthermore, in some
jurisdictions, IIED is considered a “gap-filler” tort, created to permit recovery in
“those rare instances in which a defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional
distress in a manner so unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory of
redress.”79 If the gravamen of the claim is a wrong that another cause of action was
meant to cover, IIED cannot be employed, whether or not the plaintiff succeeds
on or even relies on the other cause of action.80 Thus, in Draker
v. Schreiber,81 the court held that since the gravamen of the complaint was
defamation, IIED was inapplicable, even though the defamation action failed.82 To
maintain a claim for IIED, the plaintiff had to allege facts independent of her
defamation claim.83
A related cause of action is negligent infliction of emotional distress
(hereinafter NIED). In most jurisdictions, a plaintiff relying on this theory must
establish serious emotional harm, and prove that the defendant placed him or her
in danger of immediate bodily harm and that the emotional harm resulted from the
physical danger.84 The severity-of-harm threshold may hinder liability for NIED in
many cases of cyber-harassment, as it does with respect to IIED.85 Additionally, the
requirement of immediate physical danger, known as the “zone of danger” test, will
preclude liability for NIED in most instances of cyberbullying, because potentially
harmful speech in cyberspace does not typically involve physical danger. The
zone-of-danger requirement may be satisfied in cases of cyber-incitement to
violence which generates physical risk in the real world and in the relatively rare
cases of pushing victims to commit suicide or self-harm.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 740–41 (Tex. 2003); Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d
928, 929 (Tex. 2000).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d; see also Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612
N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993) (“[O]f the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims considered
by this Court, every one has failed because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.”).
77. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1670–71.
78. See, e.g., Engel v. Buchan, 791 F. Supp. 2d 604, 609 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that Missouri
law requires a plaintiff to prove bodily harm to recover for IIED).
79. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004).
80. Id. at 448.
81. Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App. 2008).
82. Id. at 323.
83. Id. at 323–24.
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47 & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
85. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1670–71.
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Lastly, the prima facie tort, which the Supreme Court first recognized in
Aikens v. Wisconsin,86 is defined as infliction of intentional harm, resulting in
damages, without excuse or justification.87 Under the New York version, also
endorsed in other jurisdictions,88 the tort applies only if the defendant’s conduct
“would otherwise be lawful.”89 Thus, this cause of action is not available if the
defendant’s acts fall within one of the traditional tort categories.90 Under section
870 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “liability may be imposed although the
actor’s conduct does not come within a traditional category of tort liability.”91 In
other words, the tort may apply even if the conduct falls within an existing category
of tort.92 Either way, the prima facie tort is in effect a residual principle of
intention-based liability, because the defendant’s conduct should or may be
“otherwise lawful.”93 The defendant’s intent to cause harm makes the otherwise
lawful act actionable; so the doctrine seems to punish bad motives, not wrongful
conduct.94 This feature has spawned criticism95 and led to the rejection of the
doctrine in many jurisdictions.96
According to a narrow but common interpretation of the intent element, there
can be no recovery in prima facie tort, unless malevolence is the sole motive for
defendant’s otherwise lawful act or, in Justice Holmes’s words, unless the defendant
acts from “disinterested malevolence.”97 Put differently, the defendant does not aim

86. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (“[P]rima facie, the intentional infliction of
temporal damages is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form
of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape.”) (italics added).
87. ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (N.Y. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“One who intentionally causes injury to another is
subject to liability . . . if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances.”).
88. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of
Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 450, 494–95 (1990).
89. ATI, 368 N.E.2d at 1232; see also Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451
N.E.2d 459, 467 (N.Y. 1983); Geri Shapiro, Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the
Need for Judicial Scrutiny of Malice, 63 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (1983) (discussing ATI and
other cases).
90. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1104; Vandevelde, supra note 88, at 450, 491–92.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870.
92. Vandevelde, supra note 88, at 450, 494.
93. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1104.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1104, 1107 (“This implication has evoked much criticism from courts that believe the
law should punish only wrongful acts, and not wrongful thoughts . . . . The most frequent criticism of
the prima facie tort doctrine is that courts should not make bad motives actionable.”).
96. See, e.g., Krause v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 49 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Mich. 1951) (“Bad
motive, by itself . . . is no tort. Malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make that a
wrong which in its own essence is lawful. An act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be
actionable because it is done with a bad intent.”); Teas v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 460 S.W.2d
233, 242 (Tex. App. 1970) (“If an act be lawful . . . an improper motive does not render it unlawful . . . .
Malicious motives make a bad case worse, but it cannot make that wrong which, in its own essence, is
lawful.”); Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1107–08.
97. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y. 1983)
(quoting Am. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921)); see also Shapiro,
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to promote any personal interests by his or her conduct, except venting his or her
ill will.98 The Second Restatement of Torts adopted a less rigid approach: “If the
only motive of the actor is a desire to harm the plaintiff, this fact becomes a very
important factor”99—very important rather than decisive. These interpretations are
sometimes criticized as making the “lack of excuse or justification” element
redundant. If a justification exists, malevolence cannot be the sole motivation; so if
the defendant also intended to promote a certain interest, the analysis stops at the
intent element, and the justification element will not be examined.100 An alternative
interpretation of the intent element requires that malevolence be the primary or
dominant motivation.101 Another possible interpretation requires malevolence but
not as the sole or dominant motivation. According to this approach, after
establishing malice, the court must determine whether the malicious conduct may
be excused or justified.102 Cyberbullying will often satisfy the malevolence
requirement, even under the narrow interpretation, and definitely under the more
flexible approaches.
2. Legal Barriers
In many civil law and mixed jurisdictions, children under a certain age are
exempt from liability. For example, the minimum age of liability is seven in
Germany103 and Portugal,104 twelve in Israel,105 and fourteen in Austria,106 the
Netherlands,107 and Russia.108 Age-based immunity might thwart many lawsuits of
juvenile cyberbullying victims. By contrast, and with very few exceptions,109
Anglo-American law does not normally set a minimum age for liability.110 Rather, it
imposes more lenient constraints on juvenile liability.

supra note 89, at 1117–18 (discussing the “disinterested malevolence” requirement); Vandevelde, supra
note 88, at 491 (same).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
99. Id.
100. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1118–19.
101. Id. at 1123–25.
102. Id. at 1120–22.
103. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 828, para. 1 (Ger.). The minimum
age for liability is ten years in cases of traffic accidents.
104. Código Civil [Civil Code] § 488(2) (Port.).
105. Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 5733-1972 § 9(a), 4, (Isr.).
106. ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 153 (Austria).
107. Art. 6:164 BW (Neth.).
108. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 26(2) (Russ.).
109. Georgia seems to be the exception, recognizing immunity from liability to minors under
the age of thirteen. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-6 (West 2018) (“Infancy is no defense to a tort action so
long as the defendant has reached the age of discretion and accountability prescribed by Code Section
16-3-1 for criminal offenses.”).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895I (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“One who is an infant
is not immune from tort liability solely for that reason.”); Donald Paul Duffala, Annotation, Modern
Trends as to Tort Liability of Child of Tender Age, 27 A.L.R.4th 15, §§ 2[a], 3[a] (2019).
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First, in some common law jurisdictions, children under a certain age, usually
seven or five, are conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence because they
cannot recognize and appreciate risks.111 In some jurisdictions, children under the
same age cannot be held liable for intentional torts as well because of their limited
cognitive and moral capacity.112 Arguably, intent with respect to outcomes, as
opposed to intent with respect to the conduct, should be treated like foreseeability
of harm in negligence.113 Currently, children under the age of seven are unlikely to
take part in cyberbullying, but if this occurs, they cannot be liable for intentional
torts or negligence in these jurisdictions.
Second, some jurisdictions recognize a rebuttable presumption, whereby
children within a specific age range cannot be negligent. For example, in Alabama,
Illinois, Kentucky, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, a child between
the ages of seven and fourteen is rebuttably presumed to be incapable of
negligence.114 In New Jersey, a rebuttable presumption applies to children of less
than seven years of age.115 Although rebuttable presumptions are not as detrimental
to a victim’s case as conclusive presumptions, they surely generate an
evidentiary impediment.
Third, age is relevant in determining whether a child could form the mental
attitudes which underlie the tort. In an action for negligence, if the actor is a child,
the standard of conduct to which he or she must conform to avoid being negligent
is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like
circumstances.116 In an action for an intentional tort, the age of the child is relevant
111. See, e.g., Willoughby v. Stilz, 387 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Ky. 1965) (“[A] child under seven years of
age is considered incapable of negligence.”); Faia v. Landry, 249 So. 2d 317, 319 (La. App. 1971) (same);
Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965) (same); Burns v. Eminger, 261 P. 613,
615 (Mont. 1927) (same); Walston v. Greene, 102 S.E.2d 124, 125 (N.C. 1958) (same); DeLuca
v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111–12 (Ohio 1975) (same); Dodd v. Spartanburg Ry. Gas
& Elec. Co., 78 S.E. 525, 528 (S.C. 1913) (same); Von Saxe v. Barnett, 217 P. 62, 63 (Wash. 1902)
(same); cf. Nielsen v. Bell, 370 P.3d 925, 929 (Utah 2016) (adopting a conclusive presumption for
children under the age of five); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (same).
112. See, e.g., Carey v. Reeve, 781 P.2d 904, 907 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (children under six
years of age cannot form an intent to harm others).
113. See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 698 N.E.2d 271, 278 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (explaining
that children may be liable for intentional torts where the only intent required is an intent to perform
the act, as in the case of battery, whereas children under the age of seven are not liable in negligence
because they cannot foresee the consequences of their actions); Shiflet v. Segovia, 318 N.E.2d 876, 879
(Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (same).
114. Patrick v. Mitchell, 6 So. 2d 889, 890 (Ala. 1942); Appelhans v. McFall, 757 N.E.2d 987,
992 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Willoughby, 387 S.W.2d at 11; Walston, 102 S.E.2d at 125; Kuhns v. Brugger,
390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395, 401 (Pa. 1957); Prater v. Burns, 525 S.W.2d 846, 852
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
115. Bush v. N.J. & N.Y. Transit Co., 153 A.2d 28, 33 (N.J. 1959).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also McGregor
v. Marini, 256 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 783
N.W.2d 806, 813 (N.D. 2010); Kuhns, 135 A.2d at 401; Standard v. Shine, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787
(S.C. 1982); Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533,
558 n.123 (2013). This rule also applies in Australia and in England. McHale v. Watson (1966) 115 CLR
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in determining whether the child knew with substantial certainty that his or her
intentional act would cause a harmful or offensive contact.117 Courts may conclude
that the specific defendant was unable to form the necessary intent.118 In
jurisdictions with tender-years presumptions of no fault, these adjustments are made
beyond the age covered by the presumptions,119 and in all other jurisdictions they
apply to all minors.
All three constraints pertain to fault-based liability, so children may be liable
like adults under strict liability regimes.120 Strict liability usually applies to especially
dangerous activities, such as driving or product manufacturing, or to the ownership
of dangerous things, such as dogs or weapons; thus, while a child may sometimes
be the “keeper” of an animal or the manufacturer of a product, harmful activity
subject to strict liability is less likely to involve juvenile perpetrators.121 More
importantly, all causes of action applicable to cyberbullying are fault-based.
3. Technological Barriers
A victim of juvenile cyber-wrongdoing seeking to sue the perpetrator might
face a technological barrier because technology enables wrongdoers to mask their
true identities.122 A lawsuit against an anonymous tortfeasor requires a procedural
tool to unmask his or her identity. To enable plaintiffs to do so, the law must first
devise a process for ordering the relevant platform operator to turn over the
wrongdoer’s identifying information, usually an Internet Protocol (IP) address.
Then, the plaintiff must identify the Internet Service Provider (ISP) linked to the
relevant IP address (using the WHOIS directory), and request contact information
of the user associated with this IP address.123 Sometimes, the IP address will point
to a public or a multiuser computer, and the plaintiff will need to turn to the

199, 210 (Austl.); Ken Oliphant, Children as Tortfeasors Under the Law of England and Wales, in
CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 147, 154–55 (Miquel Martín-Casals
ed., 2006).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895I cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“The
immaturity of the infant is, however, to be taken into consideration in determining, in the first instance,
whether the tort has been committed at all. In intentional torts, the state of mind of the actor is an
essential element . . . . A child may be of such tender years that he has no awareness of these matters
and is in fact incapable of the specific intent that is required.”); see also Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091,
1094 (Wash. 1955).
118. E.g., Seaburg v. Williams, 161 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959) (“Based upon the
evidence of defendant’s age, capacity, intelligence and experience, we conclude that he lacked the mental
and moral capacity to possess the intent to do the act complained of.”).
119. See, e.g., Appelhans, 757 N.E.2d at 992; Kuhns, 135 A.2d at 401.
120. See Miquel Martín-Casals, Comparative Report, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART
I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 423, 434 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (concluding that in most
legal systems children are subject to strict liability like adults).
121. Oliphant, supra note 116, at 157–58.
122. Areheart, supra note 43, at 41–42.
123. Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE
L.J. 320, 328 (2008). ISPs usually obtain and retain such information for their ongoing operations, such
as billing.
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operator of this computer system (a library, a workplace, a café, etc.) to obtain
information about the wrongdoer.124 Some legal systems are reluctant to provide
plaintiffs with unmasking abilities.125 Even in legal systems that enable
de-anonymization, tortfeasors may evade liability by using advanced anonymization
tools, such as Tor,126 by connecting through public hotspots which do not require
registration or by chance when the relevant records are lost along the way.
American courts can order online platform operators to disclose information
about anonymous wrongdoers. True, the right to anonymity is well established
under American law, and in some instances—especially when pertaining to speech
and assembly—it receives constitutional protection.127 But when there is sufficient
evidence to establish a cause of action against an anonymous user, courts enable the
victim to apply for a John Doe subpoena, ordering a third party—here a platform
operator or an Internet Service Provider—to divulge information it possesses about
that user.128 Some controversy exists about the standard of evidence for establishing
the plaintiff’s claim, which must be met prior to issuing such an order,129 but this
procedural tool’s availability is undisputed.
4. Financial Barriers
Lawsuits against juvenile cyber-wrongdoers might be hindered by two kinds
of financial difficulties—one relating to the victim and the other to the wrongdoer.
First, civil litigation is costly. The plaintiff incurs court charges, attorneys’ fees,
witnesses’ and experts’ expenditures and remuneration, opportunity costs, and
intangible harms.130 These costs impact the tendency to sue, depending also on the
probability of success and the claim-value,131 and on the plaintiff’s economic and
124. Id. (discussing the two-step process).
125. In Israel, for example, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a procedural tool for
requesting disclosure of anonymous users’ information. CA 4447/07 Mor v. Barak ITC–Int’l Telecom.
Corp. 63(3) PD 664, 717 (2010) (Isr.).
126. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14
S. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 234 (2006) (explaining that sophisticated wrongdoers can “conceal their tracks
by routing messages through a convoluted path that is difficult for authorities to uncover”). In the
related context of online anonymous copyright infringement, a federal district court explicitly admitted
that “the technology that enables [wrongdoing] has outpaced technology that prevents it.” Hard Drive
Prods., Inc. v. Doe 1-90, No. C11-03825 HRL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45509, at *23
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012).
127. A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and the Law in the United States, in LESSONS FROM THE
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 441, 442 (Ian
Kerr et al. eds., 2009).
128. See Gleicher, supra note 123, at 325 (examining the efficacy of John Doe subpoenas).
129. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 600 (4th
ed. 2011) (discussing the different standards); Gleicher, supra note 123, at 325, 337, 340–50 (same); see,
e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096–97 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (quashing a
subpoena request for identification of anonymous online users because the request failed to show that
the information related to the core claim).
130. Ronen Perry, Crowdfunding Civil Justice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1361 (2018).
131. Louis T. Visscher & Tom Schepens, A Law and Economics Approach to Cost Shifting, Fee
Arrangements and Legal Expense Insurance, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN
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psychological conditions. Litigation costs might inhibit access to justice when (1)
they exceed the claimant’s expected benefit from litigation, (2) the victim does not
have sufficient resources, or (3) the victim is unwilling to bear the costs due to
risk-aversion and the uncertainties of the process.132 Various methods have been
devised to assist meritorious claimants. For example, attorneys’ contingency fee
arrangements, whereby lawyers’ remuneration is contingent on success and
calculated as a percentage of plaintiffs’ recovery,133 third-party litigation funding,134
and recently even crowdfunding.135 But these methods may prove inadequate where
expected damages are limited and the costs of litigation—including the costs of
tracking down anonymous culprits, litigating, and enforcing judgments—are
substantial, as in many cases of cyberbullying.136
Second, juvenile wrongdoers are usually judgment-proof defendants.137 Even
if identified, sued, and held liable, they do not have the resources to adequately
compensate their victims. Inability to pay damages might undermine the goals of
civil liability, including corrective justice and deterrence.138 However, at this stage it
is notable primarily because the existence of a cause of action is futile if the victim
cannot recover damages thereunder. The two financial barriers are clearly
related: if the tortfeasor is known to be judgment-proof, expected damages are
lower; and if litigation costs exceed expected damages, the victim is very likely to
give up the lawsuit in the first place.
B. Real-Life Supervisors
1. Parents
Some of the difficulties associated with direct liability of juvenile
cyber-wrongdoers may be overcome through secondary or indirect liability. The
first category of potential defendants is wrongdoers’ parents. The common law does
not impose vicarious liability upon parents qua parents for their children’s torts.139
Thus, a parent may be vicariously liable only in one of two cases: (1) the child is his
or her servant or agent, and the general common law principles of vicarious liability

EUROPE 7, 14 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2005) (“[T]here is a critical probability of success and
a critical value of the claim below which the plaintiff will not sue.”).
132. Perry, supra note 130, at 1361.
133. Id. at 1364.
134. Id. at 1365–66.
135. Id. at 1368–70.
136. See Walther, supra note 3, at 546 (explaining that the relatively high litigation costs might
deter cyberbullying victims from pursuing meritorious claims).
137. See Areheart, supra note 43, at 42 (noting that most cyberbullies are judgment-proof);
Walther, supra note 3, at 546 (same).
138. See infra Section II.A.
139. Kaminski v. Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048, 1051 (Conn. 1990); Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d
766, 768–69 (Ga. 1971); Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Parents’ Liability for Injury or Damage
Intentionally Inflicted by Minor Child, 54 A.L.R.3d 974, § 3 (2017).
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apply;140 or (2) a statute imposes vicarious parental liability,141 either generally, as in
Hawaii142 and Louisiana,143 or in limited contexts, such as malicious or willful
causation of physical injury (with very low liability caps)144 or wrongful driving.145
A parent may also be directly liable if he or she participates in the child’s wrongful
conduct by directing or inducing it,146 consenting thereto,147 or ratifying it.148
Generally, though, parents’ liability will hinge on their independent
negligence.149 Three theories of liability may be of use. The first is negligent

140. See, e.g., Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476, 477–78 (1882) (holding a father-employer
liable for harm caused by son-employee); Altoonian v. Muldonian, 177 N.E. 830 (Mass. 1931) (same);
see also Porter, supra note 116, at 557; Habeeb, supra note 139, §§ 4–5.
141. See Michael A. Axel, Statutory Vicarious Parental Liability: Review and Reform, 32 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 559, 565–74 (1982) (discussing the history and nature of these statutes).
142. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-3 (West 2019) (“The father and mother of unmarried minor
children shall jointly and severally be liable . . . for tortious acts committed by their children . . . .”).
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (2019) (“The father and the mother are responsible for the
damage occasioned by their minor child . . . .”); Held v. Wilt, 610 So. 2d 1103, 1104
(La. Ct. App. 1992).
144. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 2019) (limiting the parent’s liability for any tort
committed by the child to $25,000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West 2019) (limiting liability
to $5,000); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $10,000); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-120 (2019) (limiting liability to $5,000, unless the parent was negligent); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2913 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $2,500); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-801 (West 2019)
(limiting liability to $1,000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.470 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $10,000);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $4,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-538.1 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $2,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.09–.10 (West 2019)
(limiting liability to $10,000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-203 (2019) (limiting liability to $2,000; applies
only to property damage); see also Hanks v. Booth, 726 P.2d 1319 (Kan. 1986) (applying the Kansas
provision); Alber v. Nolle, 645 P.2d 456, 458 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (applying the New Mexico
provision); Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rabideau, 395 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (applying the Ohio
provision).
145. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 28.15.071 (West 2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3160
(2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-702 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-11 (West 2019).
146. Porter, supra note 116, at 557; Habeeb, supra note 139, § 6.
147. Habeeb, supra note 139, § 7.
148. Id. § 8.
149. This is also true in most civil law jurisdictions. In some, the victim must establish the
parent’s fault. See, e.g., Bertil Bengtsson, Children as Tortfeasors Under Swedish Law, in CHILDREN IN
TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 415, 417–18 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006);
Susanna Hirsch, Children as Tortfeasors Under Austrian Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART
I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 7, 40–41 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing ALLGEMEINES
BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 1309 (Austria)). In others, a rebuttable
presumption of fault exists. See, e.g., Giovanni Comandé & Luca Nocco, Children as Tortfeasors Under
Italian Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 265, 278–79 (Miquel
Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing Codice civile [C.c.] §§ 2047-48 (It.)); Pieter De Tavernier, Children
as Tortfeasors Under Belgian Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS
63, 85–88 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.] art. 1384(2), (5) (Belg.),
whereby parents are liable for any damage caused by their minor children unless they can demonstrate
they have not committed a wrongful conduct); Miquel Martín-Casals et al., Children as Tortfeasors Under
Spanish Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 369, 387-90 (Miquel
Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing Spanish law); Gerhard Wagner, Children as Tortfeasors Under
German Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 217, 235–37 (Miquel
Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 832 (Ger.)).
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entrustment of a dangerous instrument. The Second Restatement of Torts offers a
relatively broad interpretation of this principle. Section 390 provides that a person
who supplies a chattel for the use of another, when he or she knows or has reason
to know that the other is likely, because of young age, to use it in a way creating
unreasonable risk of physical harm to that other or to third parties, is liable for
ensuing physical harm.150 Put differently, a parent may be directly liable for the
child’s wrongdoing if he or she was negligent in entrusting to the child an instrument
which, because of its nature, use, and purpose, is so dangerous as to constitute, in
the hands of the child, an unreasonable risk to others.151 Arguably, in the case of
cyberbullying, liability can arise if a parent negligently entrusts a computer, a tablet,
or a smartphone to a child, when the parent knows or should know that the child
is likely to use the device to cyberbully his or her peers.152
The element of entrustment does not raise a special problem in the current
context. “Entrustment” encompasses giving an item, such as a personal computer
or a smartphone, to the child as a present, allowing the child to temporarily borrow
the item, and allowing the item to be in such a position that the child could use it
even without permission.153 The element of actual or constructive knowledge is
established if the person who receives the chattel belongs to a class which is
notoriously incompetent to use it safely, lacks the individual training and experience
necessary for safe use, previously acted in a way that makes a dangerous use of the
chattel likely, or has a propensity or intent to misuse the chattel despite being able
to use it safely.154 If a child has a past record of cyber-wrongdoing (or even physical
bullying), a tendency to harass or an expressed intent to do so, the parent knows or
has reason to know of the risk. On the other hand, the element of physical harm
limits the applicability of the doctrine in cyberbullying cases, which usually do not
culminate in personal injury or death.
Moreover, although several jurisdictions follow the Restatement’s broad
language,155 many do not, so an action for negligent entrustment in the case of
cyber-wrongdoing may raise two additional difficulties. First, some jurisdictions
require actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge, that the child’s use
of the chattel would expose a third party to an unreasonable risk of injury.156 This
does not preclude parental liability for juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, but surely curtails
it. The plaintiff must establish the parent’s actual knowledge that the child is likely
to use the device unreasonably.157 Second, many jurisdictions insist that the chattel
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
151. Meier v. Schrock, 405 S.W.3d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
152. Walther, supra note 3, at 558–59.
153. Id. at 560.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. b.
155. See, e.g., Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prods., Inc., 413 N.E.2d 767, 771 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980);
Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 768 n.24 (Mich. 1977).
156. See, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 570 N.E.2d 93, 96–97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Walther, supra
note 3, at 550–52.
157. Walther, supra note 3, at 558–62.
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be “inherently dangerous.”158 Most courts have adopted a restrictive interpretation
of this term, recognizing only automobiles and firearms as inherently dangerous.159
If a parent gives the child access to a car or a gun, knowing that the child could not
be trusted with such devices, and the child harms someone by misusing the device,
then the parent can be sued for negligent entrustment.160 In contrast, electronic
devices and applications are not dangerous in the classical sense.161 Thus, for
example, the court in the seminal cyberbullying case of Finkel v. Dauber 162 held that
a computer system is not “inherently dangerous.”163
The second theory of liability is negligent supervision. In many states, when a
child commits a tort, the parent is liable for failing to exercise reasonable care in
controlling the child if two conditions are met: (1) the parent knows or has reason
to know that he or she has the ability to control the child, and (2) the parent knows
of or should know of the necessity and opportunity of exercising such control.164
Traditionally, many courts have found no foreseeability and hence no duty of care
unless the plaintiff showed that the parent-defendant knew, or at least should have
known, of the child’s dangerous propensity.165 The Third Restatement of Torts aims
to subsume such factors within a more general analysis of reasonable care.166 The
negligent supervision theory can be applied to cases of cyberbullying when the
perpetrator’s parents are aware or should be aware of the wrongdoing and can
prevent it. For example, in Boston v. Athearn,167 the court held that parents could be
held liable for negligently failing to supervise their child’s use of the family computer
and Internet account to defame his peer (by faking and abusing a Facebook account
under her name), at least after they were informed of his misconduct.168 Note,
however, that not all states recognize this doctrine. For instance, the court in Finkel
v. Dauber169 held that “there is no cause of action for negligent supervision of a
158. See, e.g., Evans v. Shannon, 776 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Ill. 2002); Kennedy v. Baird, 682
S.W.2d 377, 378–79 (Tex. App. 1984); Walther, supra note 3, at 552–57.
159. See, e.g., Wilbanks v. Brazil, 425 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Ala. 1983) (“[A]ll cases arising under
the negligent entrustment doctrine have involved entrustment of vehicles, boats, firearms, or
explosives . . . .”); Brewster v. Rankins, 600 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a golf
club is not an inherently dangerous instrument); Walther, supra note 3, at 553.
160. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1108 (2018).
161. Heller, supra note 50, at 173.
162. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
163. Id. at 702.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); Heller, supra note 50, at 169–70; Habeeb, supra note 139, § 10.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“There
must . . . be some specific propensity of the child, of which the parent has notice.”). Many courts
consider “dangerous propensity” a precondition for a finding of foreseeability. See, e.g., Fuller v. Studer,
833 P.2d 109, 113 (Idaho 1992) (finding no dangerous propensity); Porter, supra note 116, at 558–61.
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 41 reporter’s note to cmt c (AM. LAW INST. 2012); Porter, supra note 116, at 565–67, 569–70.
167. Boston v. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
168. Id. at 587.
169. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
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child, absent an allegation that the parent entrusted the child with a dangerous
instrument which caused harm to a third party.”170 As a comparative note, some
Canadian provinces impose liability based on negligent supervision with a reverse
burden of proof through specific legislation.171
In most jurisdictions, the parents are not under any duty to supervise their
child when he or she is at school or taking part in a school activity; only school
personnel and the school itself can be held liable for failing to supervise a student
who committed a wrong under these circumstances.172 Still, in some Romance
jurisdictions, the parents may be held liable for breach of a duty to educate the child,
if lack of proper education results in wrongdoing at school.173 In some Germanic
jurisdictions, when the child is at school, the parents’ duty to supervise is reduced
to a duty to reasonably verify that the school exercises proper supervision (and this
duty is presumably fulfilled if the school is public).174
The third and last theory of liability, which in essence is a generalization of the
previous two, is negligent enabling of a tort.175 Some jurisdictions hold a parent
liable for an injury caused by the child if the parent’s negligence made it possible for
the child to cause the injury and probable that the child would do so.176 Providing
a child, especially an ill-disciplined adolescent, with unlimited and unsupervised
Internet access may enable cyber-wrongdoing. Goldberg and Zipursky observe that
“courts continue to resist the dilution of the circumscribed concept of negligent
entrustment into the much broader concept of negligent enabling . . . . [T]hey reject
the composite assertion . . . that carelessness increasing the risk of misconduct by
another” calls for liability in negligence.177 But while the idea of negligent enabling
is open-ended and therefore controversial, courts have widely recognized such a

170. Id. at 702.
171. See, e.g., Parental Liability Act, S.B.C. 2001, c 45, § 3, 6, 9 (Can.) (imposing liability for
property damage caused by the child unless parents can establish non-negligence; limiting liability to
CAD 10,000); The Parental Responsibility Act, S.M. 1996, c 61, § 3, 7 (Can.) (same); Parental
Responsibility Act, S.O. 2000, c 4, § 2 (Can.) in conjunction with the Small Claims Courts Jurisdiction
and Appeal Limit, O. Reg. 626/00, § 1 (Can.) (same, with a CAD 35,000 limit).
172. See Martín-Casals, supra note 120, at 465; Oliphant, supra note 116, at 163, 165–66.
173. See, e.g., Comandé & Nocco, supra note 149, at 278, 283–84 (discussing “culpa in educando”);
Maria Manuel Veloso, Children as Tortfeasors Under Portuguese Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART
I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 311, 335 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing “culpa
in eligendo”).
174. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 149, at 47, 61; Martín-Casals, supra note 120, at 465; Wagner,
supra note 149, at 247, 263.
175. Cf. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 438–43 (1999) (discussing
the concept and enabling situations).
176. Buelke v. Levenstadt, 214 P. 42, 44 (Cal. 1923); see also Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210,
212–13 (N.C. 1962) (“A parent is liable for the act of his child if the parent’s conduct was such as to
render his own negligence a proximate cause of the injury complained of.”); Condel v. Savo, 39 A.2d
51, 52 (Pa. 1944) (“[T]he parents may be liable . . . where the negligence of the parents makes the injury
possible.”).
177. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The
Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211,
1225 (2009).
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general principle in parent-child settings.178 A greater obstacle in the current context
is that the principle has only been used with respect to physical harm.179
Parents’ liability ameliorates some of the practical difficulties with the child’s
liability—legal obstacles associated with the defendant’s age and the problem of
judgment-proof defendants. However, the technological barrier of anonymity must
be equally addressed when tort actions against wrongdoers’ parents are concerned.
If the victim cannot identify the wrongdoer, neither can he or she identify and bring
an action against a parent, unless someone perpetrated the wrongdoing through the
parent’s electronic device, and it is unclear which child was the culprit. This
observation is crucial for the construction of an efficient liability model.
2. Teachers, Schools, and Education Authorities
As with parents, the most plausible theory of liability in an action against
educators and schools is independent negligence.180 In all Western jurisdictions,
common law and civil law alike, teachers and schools are under a duty to reasonably
supervise students, and if failure to comply causes harm, it is actionable in tort.181
This duty usually applies when the children are on school premises, even if they are
not in class, or when they take part in out-of-school activities organized by the
school.182 To the extent that the educator in charge is employed by a private
institution or a public authority, the employer’s liability will usually be vicarious,183
although the institution or the authority can be directly liable if fault can be
attributed thereto.184
Negligent supervision actions may face several obstacles. For instance, in
some jurisdictions, schools owe students a duty to properly supervise school
personnel and students in order to prevent physical injury but not emotional harm,
which is the prevalent outcome of cyberbullying.185 Additionally, in most
jurisdictions, school districts and public school employees may invoke
governmental immunity in cases of negligence in policymaking or in the exercise of
discretionary functions, as opposed to operational conduct.186 The immunity does

178. See Habeeb, supra note 139, § 9.
179. See id.
180. See Fenn, supra note 27, at 2739–46 (“In cases where a victim of on-campus bullying by
another student wishes to hold a school district or its employees liable, the victim must show negligence
on the part of the school.”).
181. See, e.g., Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658, 666 (Fla. 1982); see also Martín-Casals, supra note
120, at 459 (reviewing the law in European jurisdictions).
182. Martín-Casals, supra note 120, at 459.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
184. Oliphant, supra note 116, at 166.
185. See, e.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968–69
(D. Kan. 2005) (applying Kansas law).
186. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557n (2019); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10 / 2-201
(West 2018) (as interpreted in Albers v. Breen, 806 N.E.2d 667, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004));
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(1) (2019) (as interpreted in Bowers v. City of Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d
427, 430–31 (Tenn. 1992)); Estate of Girard v. Town of Putnam, No. CV085002754-S, 2011 WL 78599,
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not apply where the supervision of students generally or the specific failures are
deemed “operational” rather than “discretionary.”187 In many jurisdictions,
immunity cannot be invoked if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant was
grossly negligent188 or acted willfully.189 In some, it is precluded “when the
circumstances make it apparent to [a] public officer that his or her failure to act
would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm.”190
In the United States, federal legislation provides additional bases for liability.
First, a victim of cyber-harassment at a public school can bring an action against the
school pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1983,191 where allowing the aggressor’s misconduct
violates the victim’s constitutional rights.192 For example, in T.E. v. Pine Bush Central
School District,193 Jewish students who suffered anti-Semitic harassment, including
verbal and physical threats,194 brought a lawsuit against the school district under
§ 1983 for the violation of the Equal Protection Clause.195 The court denied a
motion to dismiss, holding that to succeed in such an action, the plaintiff must
satisfy three conditions: (1) the victim was harassed by other students based on
membership in a protected group, such as race; (2) the harassment was known to
the school; (3) the school’s response was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances,” to the extent that an intent to harass can be attributed to the
school.196 In contrast, it seems clear that violation of state statutes on bullying in
general, and cyberbullying in particular,197 does not provide a basis for a claim under
§ 1983.198

at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2011); Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 646 (Va. 2012); Fenn, supra
note 27, at 2742–43 (discussing the immunity).
187. See Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 571 (11th Cir. 1997).
188. See, e.g., Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 646–47 (explaining that an individual entitled to the protection
of sovereign immunity may be liable if grossly negligent).
189. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Tippens, 658 S.E.2d 147, 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that the
immunity does not apply in the case of willful conduct).
190. Grady v. Town of Somers, 984 A.2d 684, 690 (Conn. 2009).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019) (“Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law . . . .”).
192. Liability of private schools under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2019) is more limited.
193. T.E. v. Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 58 F. Supp. 3d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
194. Id. at 339–50.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
196. T.E., 58 F. Supp. 3d at 368. But cf. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 371 F. App’x 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding, in a
§ 1983 claim for sexual harassment, that the third condition was not met).
197. See supra notes 25–26.
198. See O’Dell v. Casa Grande Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 4, No. CV-08-0240-PHX-GMS, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100968, at *19–20 (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2008) (discussing Arizona anti-bullying
legislation, holding that a violation of state law cannot be a basis for a § 1983 action because the section
provides a remedy for “deprivation of rights secured by the Federal Constitution and Laws.”); Chisolm
v. Tippens, 658 S.E.2d 147, 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing Georgia anti-bullying legislation,
holding § 1983 does not apply to violations of state laws).
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Second, in limited cases, a juvenile cyberbullying victim can bring an action
against the school pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits a recipient of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
or national origin.199 The United States Department of Education’s regulations
elaborate further that a recipient of federal funds may not, “on ground of race, color,
or national origin . . . [r]estrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any
advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or
benefit under the program.”200 Similarly, a recipient cannot “[d]eny an individual an
opportunity to participate in the program through the provision of services or
otherwise or afford him an opportunity to do so which is different from that
afforded others under the program” on the basis of race, color, or national origin.201
In the T.E. case, the court held that anti-Semitic harassment amounts to racial
discrimination.202 A school district can be liable under Title VI if four conditions
are met:203 (1) the school had substantial control over the circumstances, normally
because the misconduct occurred during school hours and on school grounds; (2)
the harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and discriminatory,
in the sense that it generated a “systemic effect of denying the victim equal access
to an educational program or activity, and more than episodic”; (3) the school
actually knew about the harassment (constructive knowledge is insufficient); and (4)
the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment, making its actions “clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”204 In the limited context of
cyber-harassment based on race, color, or national origin, and perpetrated by public
school students, school districts can be liable if the four conditions are met.
Third, in the appropriate cases, a juvenile cyber-harassment victim may bring
an action against the (public) school based on Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972,205 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex
(including sexual orientation206) in educational institutions receiving federal funding,
or on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,207 which prohibits disability-based
discrimination in such institutions. The analysis of claims under Title IV applies
mutatis mutandis to claims under these two statutes, which cover additional
categories of discrimination. For example, in R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Board of Education of
Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free School District,208 a student sued the school district
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2019).
200. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(1)(iv) (2019).
201. Id. § 100.3(b)(1)(vi) (2019).
202. T.E. v. Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 58 F. Supp. 3d 332, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
203. Id. at 355.
204. Id. at 355–56.
205. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2019).
206. See Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 963–65
(D. Kan. 2005) (holding on the basis of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)
and its progeny that same-sex student-on-student harassment is actionable under Title IX).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2019).
208. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 371
F. App’x 231 (2d Cir. 2010).
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under Title IX for sexual harassment by another student, who sent her three
harassing e-mails. The court held that the record was insufficient “to permit a
reasonable jury to find that S.S. endured harassment so severe and pervasive as to
have effectively denied her access to educational resources and opportunities.”209
In other words, the harassment did not satisfy the severity requirement, which sets
a high threshold for recovery.
Lastly, victims of juvenile cyber-wrongdoing may occasionally sue the school
district under state anti-discrimination legislation. For example, in L.W. v. Toms
River Regional Schools Board of Education,210 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination211 recognizes a cause of action
against a school district for student-on-student sexual-orientation harassment if the
school district knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to take
reasonable actions to end it.212 Similarly, in Doe v. Kansas City, Missouri School
District,213 the Court of Appeals of Missouri held that the state’s Human Rights
Act214 allows a claim against a school district for student-on-student sexual
harassment if the district knew or should have known of the harassment but failed
to take action.215 Although these were real-life harassment cases, the same principles
apply to cyber-harassment.
Schools’ liability for juvenile cyber-wrongdoing may raise several problems.
The most fundamental concern is that any duty to supervise and limit students’
cyber-communications might infringe on their freedom of speech.216 Students do
not enjoy the same level of constitutional protection as adults due to the “special
characteristics of the school environment.”217 Yet the boundaries of schools’
supervision duties must be consistent with the boundaries of students’ First
Amendment rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,218
the Supreme Court limited school districts’ power to regulate and punish students’
speech to instances in which on-campus expression “materially and substantially
interfer[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
209. Id. at 233.
210. L.W. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535 (N.J. 2007).
211. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2019) (“All persons shall have the opportunity
to . . . obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public
accommodation . . . without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, disability . . . nationality, sex . . . . This
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.”).
212. L.W., 915 A.2d at 540.
213. Doe v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
214. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065(2) (2019) (“It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any
person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person . . . any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public
accommodation . . . or to segregate or discriminate against any such person in the use thereof on the
grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability.”).
215. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 54.
216. Fenn, supra note 27, at 2749.
217. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007).
218. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 513 (1969).
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school” or involves “invasion of the rights of others.”219 According to subsequent
case law, schools can also regulate on-campus student expression when it is
“offensively lewd and indecent” (and “unrelated to a political viewpoint”),220 or
might be reasonably perceived as bearing the school’s imprimatur, such as a school
newspaper or play,221 or promotes criminal activity, such as drug use.222 When a
school unlawfully prevents ex ante or punishes ex post a student’s potentially harmful
cyber-communication, the latter can pursue an injunction223 or claim damages for
violation of his or her First Amendment rights under § 1983.224
An additional problem is that schools’ power may not equally extend to
off-campus activities.225 For instance, in Morse v. Frederick, 226 the Supreme Court
opined that had the offensively lewd and indecent speech discussed in a previous
case been delivered “in a public forum outside the school context, it would have
been protected.” To be sure, some federal and state courts held that schools can
regulate and discipline for off-campus cyber-wrongdoing which might materially
and substantially disrupt school life, as per Tinker.227 Still, it is unlikely that the

219. Id. at 513; Papandrea, supra note 4, at 1038–45 (discussing the Tinker test and
its applications).
220. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
221. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
222. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
223. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(awarding an injunction against a school that suspended a student who created a website critical of the
school).
224. See, e.g., J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(discussing a claim against a school for suspending a student who posted a video of her friends talking
in a disparaging fashion about a classmate); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374, 1377
(S.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing a lawsuit against a school for suspending a student who created a Facebook
page to share students’ hatred for a teacher); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding a school liable for disciplining a student
who created a parody profile of the school’s principal on an internet website after school hours).
225. See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (explaining that schools’ authority over off-campus
expression is much more limited than expression on school grounds); Kristopher L. Jiles, Trigger Fingers
Turn to Twitter Fingers: The Evolution of the Tinker Standard and its Impact on Cyberbullying amongst
Adolescents, 61 HOW. L.J. 641, 655 (2018) (same); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone
Viral: Diverging Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3416–19 (2014) (same); Papandrea, supra note 4, at 1028–30 (same); Poole,
supra note 2, at 252 (same).
226. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).
227. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48–50 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] student may be
disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct
‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least when
it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.”); Wisniewski
v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We have
recognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a
school [citations omitted].”); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist.,
No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL 4396869, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (applying Tinker to off-campus
YouTube video calling to kill teacher); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002)
(holding that the communication contained in a “Teacher Sux” website caused actual and substantial
disruption of the work of the school); see also MINN. STAT. § 121A.031(a)(3) (2018) (applying to
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school would be allowed to regulate conduct which is neither carried out on its
premises nor has a significant impact on its activities.228 Punishing off-campus
cyber-wrongdoing without legal authority may give rise to claims not only for
infringements of the freedom of speech but also for Due Process violations.229
C. Virtual Supervisors
1. The American Model
An additional layer in any civil law response to cyberbullying is secondary or
indirect liability of virtual supervisors, namely platforms that enable juvenile
cyber-activity and cyber-wrongdoing, such as Facebook, Gmail, Instagram or
YouTube. In the United States, however, it is almost impossible to bring a lawsuit
against a virtual supervisor for wrongful user-contributions, even if it knew about
their wrongful nature. The explanation goes back to the traditional distinction in
defamation law among three types of intermediaries: (1) common carriers, such as
telephone companies, which only transmit information and are not liable for
defamation;230 (2) distributors, such as bookstore owners, which distribute content
without having control over it and are liable only if they knew or had reason to
know about the defamatory nature of the publication;231 and (3) publishers, such as
newspapers, which exercise significant control over published content and are
subject to strict liability.232 In the context of online defamation, this framework
generated skewed incentives. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,233 the court held that
CompuServe, which provided users with access to a virtual newsletter but did not
review its content, was a mere distributor and therefore not liable for false and
defamatory statements made therein.234 Conversely, in Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,235 the court found that Prodigy, a bulletin board operator
that exercised some editorial control over user-generated content, was a publisher,
and could be held liable for defamatory statements made by an anonymous user

off-campus cyberbullying that “substantially and materially disrupts student learning or the
school environment”).
228. Jiles, supra note 225, at 658–59.
229. See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that a student’s Due Process was violated when she was suspended after an
off-campus posting of a video disparaging a schoolmate); Poole, supra note 2, at 254–55.
230. Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation
Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651 (2002).
231. Id. at 651–52.
232. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 184 (4th
ed. 2011).
233. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
234. Id. at 141.
235. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133, 137.

First to Printer_Perry.docx (Do Not Delete)

1246

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/20/20 9:49 AM

[Vol. 10:1219

with respect to a brokerage firm.236 The joint reading of Cubby and Stratton Oakmont
incentivized platform operators to avoid moderating online discourse because
moderating exposed them to the risk of liability, whereas not moderating protected
them from liability.237
Pressures from the Internet industry quickly led to the enactment of
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,238 whereby providers of
“interactive computer services” should not be considered publishers of “any
information provided by another information content provider.”239 In Zeran
v. America Online, Inc.,240 the court held that section 230 “creates a federal immunity
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service.”241 In particular, a message board
operator could not be found liable for defamatory postings by an anonymous user,
even though the operator had relevant knowledge after a certain point and would
have been considered a publisher under traditional defamation law.242 The court
explained that imposing liability on platform operators just because they had
knowledge about the wrongful content would defeat the purposes of section
230: promoting free speech on the one hand, and encouraging platforms’
self-regulation on the other.243 If platform operators were subject to
knowledge-based liability, receiving a notification about a potentially wrongful
statement would require making a “careful yet rapid investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment concerning the
information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether
to risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that information.”244 The
vast number of postings would create “an impossible burden in the Internet
context.”245 Because platform operators would be liable only for the publication of
information and not for its removal, they would have a strong incentive to simply
remove content upon notification.246
Following Zeran, section 230 has provided online platforms, be they
publishers or distributors under traditional law,247 with effective immunity from
236. Id. at *4–5; see also Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639,
650–51 (2014) (discussing the impact of Stratton Oakmont). Some of the statements about the firm were
later found to be true, but it was too late for the defendant. See Joe Nocera, Sex and Drugs and
I.P.O.’s: Martin Scorsese’s Approach in ‘The Wolf of Wall Street,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/movies/martin-scorseses-approach-in-the-wolf-of-wallstreet.html [ https://perma.cc/L37B-VN8D ].
237. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
238. Communications Decency Act § 230 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018)).
239. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
240. Zeran, 129 F.3d 327.
241. Id. at 330.
242. Id. at 330–32.
243. Id. at 333.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 519 (Cal. 2006) (“There is even less reason to
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liability for user-generated content.248 The immunity covers all kinds of platforms,
including social networking websites and applications, such as Facebook or
Twitter,249 search engines, such as Google and Yahoo,250 operators of online
business-review systems, such as Yelp,251 e-commerce platforms, such as
Amazon,252 and operators of online message boards253 and chat rooms.254
Furthermore, the immunity applies to all relevant causes of action, including
defamation, privacy invasions, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil
rights violations.255 As noted above, the immunity applies even if the platform knew
or should have known about the wrongdoing256 or acted negligently with respect to
user wrongdoing.257
2. Alternatives and Calls for Reform
The American position on this matter is exceptional. In the European Union,
for example, a victim of online defamation can frequently bring an action against
the platform. Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive258 provides that some
intermediaries, such as hosting service providers, are liable only if they knew about
the wrongful statement and failed to remove it following the victim’s request (a

suppose that Congress intended to immunize ‘publishers’ but leave ‘distributors’ open to liability, when
the responsibility of publishers for offensive content is greater than that of mere distributors.”).
248. However, empirical studies have shown that more than one-third of such claims survive
the section 230 defense, and accordingly websites often have to engage in long and expensive legal
battles. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 493 (2010);
Chander, supra note 236, at 655.
249. Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065–66 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding
that Facebook “provides an interactive computer service” for the purposes of section 230).
250. Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (holding that
“Yahoo! should be entitled to immunity because it acted as an interactive computer service”).
251. Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Yelp qualifies as an
‘interactive computer service’ within the meaning of the CDA.”).
252. Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
(concluding that Amazon is an interactive computer service provider).
253. DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App’x. 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that an online message
board operator is an interactive computer service provider).
254. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013–17 (Fla. 2001) (holding that America
Online, the operator of a chat room in which a third party posted obscene images of the plaintiff’s son,
is immune under section 230).
255. See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The majority of
federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service.”); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 171 (2014) (listing relevant
causes of action); Chander, supra note 236, 651 (“[Section 230] largely immunized online service
providers from secondary liability for most torts committed through their service.”). For an extensive
list of cases, see Chander, supra note 236, at 653 n.58.
256. CITRON, supra note 255, at 171.
257. Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).
258. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the
Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 14 ( July 17, 2000).
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notice-and-takedown regime). This means, first, that knowledge can generate
liability. Moreover, many platforms are not considered intermediaries for these
purposes, and may be liable even in the absence of knowledge about the wrongful
content. In the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia,259 the European Court of Human Rights
held that a news website was liable for defamation in anonymous user comments.260
The court agreed that the website was a publisher rather than an intermediary, and
that it was not exempt from the duty to monitor or from liability despite
implementing a notice-and-takedown system.261 In mid-June 2015, the Grand
Chamber of the court upheld the earlier decision, possibly limiting its application to
news portals.262
A more structured approach was endorsed in the United Kingdom, where the
Defamation Act links the platform’s liability to the speaker’s unavailability.263
Section 5(2) stipulates that a website operator is generally not liable for a defamatory
statement posted on the website if it was not the one who posted that statement.264
However, the defense can be defeated (and the operator exposed to liability) if the
victim had insufficient information to identify and bring proceedings against the
speaker, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the operator did not properly
respond to the complaint.265 A proper response requires obtaining the speaker’s
contact information and providing it to the victim or removing the
defamatory content.266
Some commentators advocated replacing section 230 with a
notice-and-takedown regime, which is not only comparable to the European
model,267 but has also been applied in the United States to copyright infringement
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).268 According to the DMCA,
where an Internet service provider offers system caching, information storage, or
information location tools, and it receives actual notice of the infringing material, it
must remove the content or risk liability through the loss of immunity.269 Others
proposed a more limited reform, using a notice-and-takedown model only with
respect to cyber-wrongdoing against children. When a platform operator is notified

259. Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 94.
260. Id. at paras. 28, 50, 94. See also Mart Susi, International Decision: Delfi AS v. Estonia, 108
AM. J. INT’L L. 295 passim (2014) (discussing the Delfi decision).
261. Delfi, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 28, 50.
262. Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, paras. 62, 115, 159.
263. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (U.K.).
264. Id. § 5(2).
265. Id. § 5(3)–(4).
266. Id. § 5(3)(c), (5).
267. A notice-and-takedown regime was also adopted in non-European jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Harmful Digital Communication Act 2015, s 24 (N.Z.) (“No civil or criminal proceedings may be
brought against an online content host in respect of the content complained of . . . if the online content
host—(a) receives a notice of complaint about the specific content; and (b) complies with [a
takedown process].”).
268. Areheart, supra note 43, at 43.
269. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (2018).
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that a child is being harassed through the platform, the operator would be obliged
to remove the offending content or cut off the offender’s access to the site.270 Yet
none of these proposals have been seriously considered by Congress, so the
absolute immunity holds.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. The Wrongdoer
1. Outline
At first glance, a cyber-wrongdoer’s liability is a special case of direct tort
liability, so its economic justifications should be similar.271 Efficient deterrence
entails internalization by the wrongdoer of the social harm caused by his or her
wrongful (that is, inefficient) conduct.272 Only if expected liability is equivalent to
the expected externalized cost273 will the potential injurer internalize that cost and
take cost-effective precautions.274 In the context of juvenile cyber-wrongdoing,
three attributes of the wrongdoers undermine the deterrent effect of liability: (1)
inability to compensate; (2) limited cognitive, emotional, and social capacity; and (3)
possible anonymity.
2. Inability to Compensate
Children and adolescents are generally judgment-proof defendants: even if
found liable, they do not have the resources to compensate their victims.275 If
injurers are unable to fully compensate for harms caused, they will not internalize
the social cost of their conduct. From their perspective, the expected expense may
be considerably lower than the expected (social) harm, so the incentive for choosing
the optimal level of care is impaired.276 For example, assume that there is a
probability of 0.02 that A’s conduct will cause a $100,000 loss to B, and that A can
reduce the probability of harm to 0.01 by adopting a certain precaution for $800.

270. Poole, supra note 2, at 245–50, 260.
271. See, e.g., Alain Sheer & Asghar Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of the Law
of Defamation, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 364 (1985) (analyzing the goals and consequences of defamation law
from an economic perspective).
272. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 328 (2012);
Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45
GA. L. REV. 407, 426 (2011); Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 987, 990, 994–95 (2008); Ronen
Perry, Strike-Out, 68 ALA. L. REV. 445, 472 (2016).
273. In cases of negligence-based liability, expected liability may exceed expected
externalized cost.
274. Miller & Perry, supra note 272, at 346.
275. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986)
(defining judgment-proof defendants).
276. See Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (1994);
Shavell, supra note 275, at 45; Comment, The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic Analysis,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 157–59 (1983).
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The cost of care ($800) is lower than the ensuing reduction in expected harm
((0.02 0.01) $100,000=$1,000), so the law needs to incentivize A to take this
precaution. Now assume that the expected value of A’s assets during the subsequent
litigation is $30,000 and that A is risk-neutral. Liability would not provide an
adequate incentive for choosing the optimal level of care. Under a negligence rule,
the expected sanction for failing to take the efficient precaution would be only
0.02 $30,000=$600, whereas the cost of precaution is $800. Under a strict liability
regime, A would only save (0.02 0.01) $30,000=$300 by taking an $800
precaution. Either way, A will not take the necessary precaution.277
As law and economics literature demonstrates, primary wrongdoers’ liability is
inefficient, and supervisors’ liability may be desirable, if the wrongdoer is
judgment-proof.278 Specifically, one of the main justifications for employers’
vicarious liability is that employees are frequently judgment-proof defendants.
Employees’ deterrence is sub-optimal, so an alternative liability model is necessary
to avoid inefficient conduct.279 The same rationale applies a fortiori to minors, who
rarely have any assets. Given juvenile wrongdoers’ inability to pay,280 imposing
liability on them would frequently be inefficient. Liability would not deter potential
wrongdoers and only entail considerable administrative costs. A substantive defense
may be justified, at least if efficient conduct can be secured through another
liability model.
3. Limited Cognitive, Emotional, and Social Capacity
Children and adolescents might not be able to fully grasp the wrongfulness of
their conduct, and even when they do, they might not be able to rationally respond
to the risks.281 The reasons may vary across age groups. Young children might be
unable to predict the negative consequences of their conduct,282 undermining any
attempt to incentivize care through internalization of risk. Even when they can
evaluate the risks, they might be unable to determine whether the likelihood of
negative consequences makes their conduct morally undesirable and legally

277. Note that the incentive to take care is sharper under a negligence rule, because injurers can
avoid liability entirely by choosing the proper level of care rather than only reduce its probability.
Shavell, supra note 275, at 47.
278. Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 passim (1988) [hereinafter Sykes,
The Boundaries]; Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 passim (1984)
[hereinafter Sykes, The Economics].
279. Sykes, The Boundaries, supra note 278, at 567–68.
280. See Areheart, supra note 43, at 42–43 (noting that most cyberbullies are judgment-proof);
Walther, supra note 3, at 546 (same).
281. Areheart, supra note 43, at 43.
282. See, e.g., Jodie M. Plumert & David C. Schwebel, Social and Temperamental Influences on
Children’s Overestimation of Their Physical Abilities: Links to Accidental Injuries, 67 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 317, 318 (1997) (“[I]mmature cognitive skills such as errors in judging danger or the
inability to foresee consequences may put children at risk for accidents.”).
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wrong;283 and even if they fully realize the risks, and conclude that the risks make
the conduct wrongful, civil liability might not be the sort of sanction that deters
wrongdoing. Children would not be very impressed by a story about a judicial
process in which they may be required to pay an amount of money they cannot
predict and do not possess. Still, young children pose a lesser risk of cyberbullying.
They are more closely supervised by adults, and less likely to have access to
electronic means of communication and to use them to communicate with peers.
Adolescents raise a different and much greater problem, not only because they
have access to electronic means of communication and intensively use them, but
also because they are more inclined to irrationally take risks.284 Research shows that
by mid-adolescence, around the age of fifteen, individuals’ cognitive capacity to
make rational decisions, involving individual cost-benefit analysis, is similar to that
of adults under neutral conditions.285 However, under emotional stimuli,
adolescents are more prone to acting irrationally, making emotion-based decisions
with inadequate cognitive oversight, and ignoring risks that adults would take into
account.286 Adolescent risk-taking generally, and offensive conduct in particular, can
be partly understood as arising from a “maturity gap” between cognitive and
intellectual development on the one hand, and emotional and psychosocial
development on the other.287 Emotional and social deficiencies might overwhelm
their capacity for rational choice and lead to reckless and potentially
harmful conduct.288
Several phenomena contribute to this inclination to take risks. First, a
substantial body of research demonstrates that adolescents are more sensitive to
rewards, more inclined to reward-seeking than adults (and children), give more
weight to rewards, particularly social rewards, and therefore discount risks in making
choices.289 Quick and considerable development of the neurobiological
socioemotional system around the time of puberty leads to an increase in

283. See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg-Berg, Development of Children’s Prosocial Moral Judgment, 15
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 128 (1979) (finding that elementary school children’s reasoning “tended
to be hedonistic, stereotyped, approval and interpersonally oriented, and/or involved the labeling of
others’ needs.”).
284. See, e.g., Brooke A. Ammerman et al., Risk-Taking Behavior and Suicidality: The Unique
Role of Adolescent Drug Use, 47 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 131, 132 (2018) (“[I]t
is generally agreed that adolescence is a developmental period marked by the emergence and escalation
of risk-taking . . . and that these behaviors increase from early to late adolescence.”); Natasha Duell et
al., Age Patterns in Risk Taking Across the World, 47 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 1052, 1065 (2018)
(“[A]dolescents demonstrate a heightened propensity, or inherent inclination, to take risks”); Laurence
Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78,
79 (2008) (“[A]dolescents engage in more risky behavior than adults.”).
285. Elizabeth Scott et al., Brain Development, Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 29, 32–33, 34–35, 37–38 (2018).
286. Id. at 30, 34–37.
287. Id. at 20.
288. Id. at 33.
289. Id. at 13, 15, 20, 21–23; Steinberg, supra note 284, at 83.
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reward-seeking, which peaks at around fifteen, and then starts to decrease.290
Consequently, adolescents are shortsighted: they seek immediate rewards and
discount future consequences of their deeds.291 Additionally, their sensitivity to
rewards undermines their impulse control.292
Second, research shows that sensation seeking increases from childhood to
adolescence, peaks in the late adolescence years, and subsequently decreases.293
Sensation seeking is the attraction to varied, novel, complex, and intense
experiences, and the readiness to “take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for
the sake of such experiences.”294 Sensation-seeking individuals underestimate or
accept risks, including legal and financial risks, as the price for the reward provided
by the experience.295 Adolescents, as sensation seekers, might overlook or
undervalue risks and negative consequences of novel and thrilling activities,
including various forms of bullying, thereby making irrational decisions.296
Third, adolescents are more impulsive.297 The system of impulse control and
emotional regulation develops gradually and slowly during adolescence and is not
fully mature until the early to mid-twenties.298 In adolescence, this system “can be
overwhelmed by emotional and social responses, contributing to short-sighted
choices” without forethought and consideration of long-term costs.299 Adolescents
might, therefore, act impulsively in the face of potentially harmful consequences
and legal sanctions. The Supreme Court observed the limited deterrent effect of
legal sanctions on teenagers in the context of capital punishment, holding that “[t]he
likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent.”300 In a subsequent case, the Court added that “[a] lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in

290. Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 216, 220 (2010).
291. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 21, 23–24 (2018).
292. Id. at 35.
293. K. Paige Harden et al., Developmental Differences in Reward Sensitivity and Sensation Seeking
in Adolescence: Testing Sex-Specific Associations with Gonadal Hormones and Pubertal Development, 115
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 161–62 (2018); Scott et al., supra note 285, at 31.
294. MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS AND BIOSOCIAL BASES OF
SENSATION SEEKING 27 (1994); Marvin Zuckerman, Sensation Seeking, in HANDBOOK OF
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 455, 462 (Mark R. Leary & Rick H. Hoyle
eds., 2009).
295. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 294, at 27.
296. Id.
297. For definitions of impulsivity, see F. Gerard Moeller et al., Psychiatric Aspects of Impulsivity,
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1783, 1783 (2001) (explaining that impulsivity is swift action without
forethought and conscious judgement).
298. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 13, 16, 21, 26–28, 31; Steinberg, supra note 290, at 216,
220–21.
299. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 26, 50.
300. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988).
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adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”301
Fourth, adolescents are more “sensitive to external social stimuli,” particularly
peer pressure.302 “Recent research indicates that a network of brain systems
governing thinking about social relationships undergoes significant changes in
adolescence in ways that increase individuals’ concern about the opinion of
other[s],” mostly peers.303 Susceptibility to peer pressure, especially pressure to
engage in antisocial behavior, increases during early adolescence, peaks around age
fourteen, and declines thereafter.304 This susceptibility combines with adolescents’
greater exposure to peer pressure. Adolescents spend more time with peers than
children and adults, and use more intensive peer pressure to foster group solidarity
and uniformity and to distinguish group members from nonmembers.305 Peer
pressure may encourage misconduct when the peers are also reward seeking,
sensation seeking, and impulsive, as is the case with adolescents.
Even without any pressure, “the mere presence of peers activates the brain’s
reward [centers] to a much greater extent among adolescents,” and increases their
preference for immediate rewards, and inclination to take risks and behave in an
antisocial manner.306 In fact, even if peers are not present, adolescents’ conduct is
affected by anticipated peer response: they are more likely than adults to try
impressing their peer group.307 Peer pressure, presence, or even anticipated
endorsement can overcome incentives (moral, monetary, or other) to avoid
wrongdoing. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the riskiest “behavior in which adolescents
engage, [including] delinquency, substance use, and reckless driving, takes place in
the company of peers.”308 Peer impact was identified by the Supreme Court as one
of the features undermining legal attempts to deter adolescent misconduct through
legal sanctions and justifying a more lenient legal response to
juvenile wrongdoing.309

301. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
367 (1993)).
302. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 13, 15–16, 20, 24–25.
303. Id. at 24; Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer
Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1531 (2007) (observing that “there is little doubt that
peers actually influence each other and that the effects of peer influence are stronger during adolescence
than in adulthood”).
304. Steinberg & Monahan, supra note 303, at 1531.
305. Id. at 1531.
306. Kaitlyn Breiner et al., Combined Effects of Peer Presence, Social Cues, and Rewards on
Cognitive Control in Adolescents, 60 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 292, 292 (2018)
(“Adolescents showed diminished cognitive control to positive social cues when anticipating a reward
in the presence of peers relative to when alone, a pattern not observed in older participants.”); Scott et
al., supra note 285, at 41–42, 43–44; Steinberg, supra note 284, at 85, 90–92 (explaining that peers make
risky activities even more rewarding).
307. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 50–51.
308. Steinberg & Monahan, supra note 303, at 1531.
309. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”).
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4. Anonymity
As explained above, technology facilitates anonymous misconduct, and this is
indeed very common among adolescents.310 To bring an action against an
anonymous wrongdoer, the victim needs to (1) obtain the perpetrator’s IP address
from the platform operator, and (2) obtain the wrongdoer’s identity from the ISP,
as identified by the IP address. As these two steps jeopardize both the anonymous
user’s freedom of speech and his or her right to privacy, the legal process is cautious
and complex, hence very costly. Moreover, sophisticated users can hide their IP
addresses.311 Even when the real IP address used for wrongdoing can be
ascertained, it may be very difficult to attribute the tort to a specific person if the
tortfeasor was connected to a publicly accessible router312 or—perhaps
illegally—to another person’s private router.313 An action against the wrongdoer
may also be impossible if neither the platform nor the ISP retains a log of users’
activities for a long enough period (as actually occurred in Zeran).314 Finally, a legal
disclosure mechanism would often be restricted by territorial boundaries, enabling
anonymous wrongdoers using foreign websites or foreign ISPs to get off scot-free.
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined the “territorial limits of [its]
subpoena power.”315 It vacated a John Doe subpoena issued at the request of a
Virginia carpet-cleaning business to a California-based business-rating website
(Yelp), which published anonymous users’ negative reviews of the plaintiff, because
the statements were published outside its jurisdiction.316 Had the defamatory
statements been published in a different country, rather than a different state, the
plaintiff would have faced even greater obstacles.

310. Areheart, supra note 43, at 41–42; Calvert, supra note 9, at 20; Grant, supra note 2, at
173–74, 198–99; Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643–45; King, supra note 12, at 852; Poole, supra note 2, at
243, 259; Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1479–80.
311. See supra note 126.
312. This was one of the reasons for denying a John Doe a subpoena in the copyright
infringement case of VPR Internationale v. Does 1-1017, No. 11-2068, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64656,
at *4 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) (“The list of IP addresses attached to VPR’s complaint suggests . . . a
similar disconnect between IP subscriber and copyright infringer. The ISPs include a number of
universities, . . . as well as corporations and utility companies.”).
313. See, e.g., Carolyn Thompson, Bizarre Pornography Raid Underscores Wi-Fi Privacy Risks,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2011, 5:52:36 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42740201/ [ https://
perma.cc/Z9TZ-28MH ] (describing cases in which homeowners were accused of downloading child
pornography but it later transpired that other parties had connected to the homeowners’ wireless
routers to commit the offenses).
314. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997). The cost of information
retention is correlated with the amount of daily traffic and the required duration of retention. More
importantly, retention laws should not infringe basic rights. On April 8, 2014, the European Court of
Justice held that the EU Data Retention Directive, Directive 2006/24/EC, which required telecom
companies to store user data for up to two years, was invalid because it infringed on the right to privacy
and the right to the protection of personal data. Case C-293/12, Dig. Rights
Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res., 2014 E.C.R. 238.
315. Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440, 444 (Va. 2015).
316. Id. at 445–46.
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If identification of a potential defendant is technically impossible, this party
will not internalize the social costs of the undesirable conduct; the mere existence
of a cause of action will not generate any deterrent effect.317 If identification is
possible, but its costs are prohibitively high, the victim might be deterred from
bringing or continuing a valid lawsuit, undermining any deterrent effect of
liability.318 If the victim is capable of and willing to establish the wrongdoer’s
identity, the wrongdoer will internalize the costs of the wrongdoing, and efficient
deterrence will be achieved (subject to the caveats concerning juvenile wrongdoers);
but the administrative costs might outweigh the benefits in terms of cost-reducing
deterrence, making the entire process inefficient.319 Finally, even if identification
costs are lower than the benefits in terms of deterrence, their magnitude might
render another party (for example, a virtual supervisor) a more cost-effective target
for enforcement efforts.
B. Real-Life Supervisors
1. The Economic Justification for Liability
The classical economic justification for supervisors’ liability has two
complementary components.320 The first is the likelihood that the supervised would
not be incentivized to avoid wrongful conduct by the prospect of liability, for
example, because he or she is judgment-proof, or because of a limited cognitive,
emotional, and social capacity. This component explains why primary wrongdoers’
liability is insufficient. The second component is the supervisor’s ability to take
cost-effective measures to prevent wrongful conduct by the supervised. Supervisors
can normally take two kinds of measures: (1) direct monitoring of the supervised,
accompanied by reminders of the standard of conduct;321 and (2) creating an
incentive structure for proper conduct.322 In the juvenile cyber-wrongdoing context,
this may translate into educating children about the limits of cyber-activity,
monitoring their activity, and implementing a reward-and-punishment system
within the supervisor-child relationship. The important inquiry is always whether
the cost of any measure is lower than the ensuing reduction in expected harm.
Two questions arise at this juncture. First, which of the child’s real-life
supervisors should bear the burden? Second, what kind of liability rule should be
used? The first question requires identification of the cheapest cost avoider, namely
the supervisor who can obtain the necessary information about the misconduct and
take measures to prevent it at the lowest cost. Cheapest avoiders of real-world

317. Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Who Should Be Liable for Online Anonymous Defamation?,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 162, 167 (2015).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Sykes, The Boundaries, supra note 278, passim; Sykes, The Economics, supra note 278, passim.
321. Sykes, The Boundaries, supra note 278, at 569 (discussing employers’ liability).
322. Id. at 570 (discussing employers’ liability).
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misconduct of others would normally be identified on the basis of temporal and
spatial proximity. Schools were best situated to respond to children’s wrongdoing
during schooltime, and parents (or caregivers) were the least cost avoiders at other
times. Technology has somewhat changed this reality, as parents may be the only
supervisors with access to electronic equipment used by their children. For example,
if students harass their peer using instant messaging applications on their mobile
phones, the school’s access to the content may be strictly limited. The proposed
liability model assumes that control over the electronic equipment used by the
wrongdoer is a key factor. This point will be elaborated below.323
As regards the preferable rule, the starting point is that both strict-vicarious
and negligence-based liability can incentivize supervisors to take risk-reducing
measures when their cost is lower than the expected harm they can prevent.324 Law
and economics literature provides some guidelines for choosing between the two.
A negligence-based regime has an advantage where the supervisor could not have
reasonably done anything to prevent the child’s wrongdoing, because imposition of
liability in such circumstances (required under a strict liability rule) has no benefit
from a deterrence perspective and generates considerable administrative costs.325
Negligence-based liability does not have a similar weakness, because unavailability
of reasonable precautions entails no liability. Admittedly, substantiating negligence
is a costly process, and factual and legal uncertainties might result in over-deterrence
and redundant, costly litigation. Yet litigation with no benefit in terms of deterrence
is less likely under a negligence rule. Strict-vicarious liability may have an advantage
over a negligent-supervision rule in terms of deterrence when “there is a significant
risk of under-detection of the failures of the [supervisor’s] preventive measures.”326
2. Power Without Information
Reasonably educating children not to abuse technology to harm others, and
responding decisively when cases of cyber-wrongdoing are detected, should not be
very costly for real-life supervisors. But while these measures may somewhat reduce
the risk of cyber-wrongdoing, they are inadequate. The main problem here is that
real-life supervisors, especially parents, have considerable power to affect the
conduct of supervised children, but lack the information necessary for exercising
such control. There are several reasons for this.
First, supervisors of a school-age child cannot be reasonably expected to
monitor in real time every deed and every word of that child. Such monitoring
would disrupt other activities that supervisors carry out. Constant real-time
monitoring may be cost-justified where the supervised poses a significant risk to
323.
324.
does not.
325.
Liability as
326.

See infra Section II.D.3.
Strict liability also induces efficient activity levels, whereas a classical negligence rule
Catherine M. Sharkey, Institutional Liability for Employees’ Intentional Torts: Vicarious
a Quasi-Substitute for Punitive Damages, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019).
Id. at 5.
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himself or herself (as in the case of toddlers) or to others (as in the case of inmates),
but seems excessive and unrealistic in the case of school-age children. Thus, parents
and school personnel rarely witness children’s cyber-activity as it unfolds and cannot
immediately respond to misconduct. Second, whether we consider constant
real-time monitoring or mere periodic review of the child’s cyber-activity, detecting
misconduct entails examination of stacks of content, taking different forms (text,
pictures, videos, etc.), continuously created on various platforms, not only by the
specific child, but also by multiple correspondents. Supervisors usually have work,
household commitments, and leisure activities, which limit the time and energy they
can dedicate to such examination. The cost of performing this task would be
prohibitively high. Third, even if a supervisor could reasonably review all
cyber-communications, the content would often be unintelligible due to the use of
adolescent cyber-slang or group-speak, an esoteric subtext, or an unknown real-life
background. Adult supervisors lack the expertise to readily understand children’s
social interaction in the digital realm when revealed to them. Fourth, the
supervisor’s ability to monitor the child’s cyber-activity may be subject to
privacy-related constraints. Under privacy law, school employees have limited
access to students’ cyber-communications. Parents, who do have access, may be
justifiably hesitant to invade children’s privacy. Psychologists advocate authoritative
parenting, which “involves active engagement with the teenager’s life but not
excessive monitoring, which [can either] generate intense opposition or inhibit
development of the [teen’s] ability to make autonomous choices.”327 Fifth,
adolescents can conceal some of their cyber-activity, for example, by deleting
conversations or application logs, using password protected websites, or operating
fake profiles. Finally, the burden of obtaining information may be exacerbated when
the supervisor is simultaneously responsible for more than one person. Parents may
have more than one child, and schools have hundreds of students. In conclusion,
monitoring is very costly in the absence of a concrete substantiated complaint about
a specific child’s misbehavior.
High information costs may have undesirable outcomes. If supervisors cannot
practically become aware of the child’s wrongdoing, they will not know when they
need to react. Imposing liability will not incentivize them to take any measures to
prevent or stop the wrongdoing. In such a case, a claim against the supervisor will
have a high administrative cost with no benefit in terms of harm prevention. If
obtaining information is possible, but its cost exceeds the supervisor’s expected
liability, the supervisor will choose not to obtain the necessary information, without
which he or she cannot and will not respond to the child’s (unknown) wrongdoing.
Again, liability will have a high administrative cost and no benefit in terms of harm
prevention. If information costs plus the costs of harm prevention measures are
lower than expected liability, imposing liability will induce economically justified
action by the supervisor. Yet it might not be efficient overall if the net social benefit
327.

Scott et al., supra note 285, at 38–39.
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of the supervisor’s prevention efforts, namely expected harm minus the cost of the
measures taken, including the high information cost, is lower than the administrative
cost of the claim.
3. Anonymity
Courts cannot impose liability on an unidentified party, and if the juvenile
cyber-wrongdoer is anonymous, his or her real-life supervisors will also be
unknown. The high cost of identifying an anonymous wrongdoer is a problem that
imposing liability on a real-life supervisor cannot solve, because the cost of
identifying the supervisor may be just as high. Admittedly, imposing liability on a
supervisor entails identification of the supervisor, not the specific wrongdoer. An
identified supervisor can be found liable for allowing cyber-wrongdoing by an
unidentified child using the supervisor’s equipment, such as a school computer or
router. Still, the wrongdoer’s anonymity will normally mask the supervisor’s identity,
so imposing liability on either will require a costly unmasking process. To bring an
action against an anonymous wrongdoer’s supervisor, the victim must obtain the
wrongdoer’s IP address from the platform operator and then obtain the
wrongdoer’s or the supervisor’s identity from the ISP.328 This is a costly process.
Most tactics used by the tortfeasor to conceal his or her identity, apart from using
the supervisor’s multiuser computer or router to anonymously connect to the
Internet, will further hinder the supervisor’s identification.329 Service providers’ data
retention limits are another hurdle.330
If supervisors have reason to believe that their identification is technically
impossible, they will not be incentivized to take cost-effective measures to prevent
cyber-wrongdoing. If identification is possible, but its costs are very high, victims
might be deterred from bringing or continuing valid lawsuits, and supervisors will
not internalize the harm.331 If the victim can easily establish the wrongdoer’s
identity, the wrongdoer or the supervisor will internalize the costs of the
wrongdoing, and efficient deterrence will be achieved; but the administrative costs
might outweigh the benefits in terms of cost-reducing deterrence, making the entire
process inefficient. Finally, even if identification costs are lower than the benefits
in terms of deterrence, their magnitude might render another party (for example, a
virtual supervisor) a more cost-effective target for enforcement efforts.

328. See supra Section II.A.4.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. The impact is related to supervisors’ perception of the likelihood that supervised children
mask their identities when harming others.
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C. Virtual Supervisors
1. The Economic Justification for Liability
Imposing liability on juvenile cyber-wrongdoers might not provide efficient
deterrence at a reasonable administrative cost. Minors’ inability to compensate their
victims, grasp the wrongfulness of their conduct, and rationally respond to the
prospect of liability, and the high cost of identifying anonymous wrongdoers,
prevent internalization of the social costs of wrongdoing or make efficient
deterrence wasteful due to the administrative cost. Imposing liability on real-life
supervisors can help control juvenile misconduct but might involve high
information costs and is also hampered by anonymity. Under these circumstances,
virtual supervisors’ liability should be considered.
Imposing liability on virtual supervisors can incentivize them to take the
necessary precautions to prevent cyber-wrongdoing. The benefits are clear. First,
virtual supervisors are less likely to be judgment-proof or lack the cognitive,
emotional, and social skills to understand the potential impact of the conduct and
its legal consequences. Second, when the wrongdoer and the real life-supervisor are
anonymous, the administrative cost of litigating a case against them might be
significantly higher than that of pursuing an action against a virtual supervisor.
Third, parties who are jointly liable for a particular harm have an interest in reducing
their own shares of the burden. Because any difficulty in identifying and suing the
wrongdoer or the real-life supervisor will result in greater expected liability for the
virtual supervisor, the latter has an incentive to facilitate the identification of
anonymous wrongdoers and their real-life supervisors. To do so, virtual supervisors
may take various measures, such as preventing contributions by unidentified users,
collecting and retaining user information, and volunteering this information in the
case of a lawsuit (subject to applicable law).332
2. Inefficiencies of Liability
Imposing liability on virtual supervisors has its weaknesses. First and
foremost, the cost of precautions available to platform operators may be high. The
strictest supervision model is specific monitoring. Human monitoring of
user-generated content entails hiring and training staff to review such content and
distinguish between lawful and unlawful content. The cost per item is not trivial,
and it is incurred with respect to all user-generated content—as opposed to the
administrative cost of an action against the wrongdoer or a real-life supervisor
(including identification costs, where applicable), which is incurred only in the rare
case of a legal complaint about a specific wrongful contribution. “Automated
monitoring requires the development and implementation of technologies that

332. Virtual supervisors might not be very keen to drag their users into court because this may
harm their business. But the ability to share the burden will surely result in some increase in the
likelihood of data collection.
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preclude [wrongful contributions] while allowing legitimate speech. Once the
mechanism has been developed, it can be implemented at a very low marginal
cost.”333 However, the costs of continued development of the necessary tools
cannot be ignored. Moreover, “automated systems are still expected to make more
judgment mistakes than trained humans, and human correction mechanisms [may
be] costly.”334
An alternative supervision model is the “notice-and-takedown” procedure,
whereby platform operators remove user-generated content when notified that this
content is suspected of being wrongful.335 They can either allow the publisher of
removed content to contest the removal, and individually investigate
wrongful-removal complaints, or automatically restore the content upon the
publisher’s assumption of full legal responsibility for the publication. The main
advantage of this method is that it significantly reduces monitoring costs. But an
automatic notice-and-takedown system enables anyone with the desire to silence
another’s speech to do so easily and to engage in mass censorship,336 whereas
integrating human discretion would turn it into a costly selective-monitoring system.337
If supervision costs exceed its benefits in terms of preventing harmful
conduct, virtual supervisors’ liability will not incentivize supervisors to take
measures to prevent wrongful user conduct. Under a negligence-based rule,
supervisors will not be liable at all for failing to take the supervisory measures; and
under a strict-liability regime, they will prefer bearing liability to taking such
measures. Either way, virtual supervisors’ liability will not prevent
cyber-wrongdoing. Even if harm-prevention benefits exceed supervision costs, the
net benefit may be too low to justify the administrative cost of a liability rule. Virtual
supervisors might also try to save on monitoring costs without being exposed to
liability through extreme and socially undesirable measures—from an immoderate
takedown policy to prevention of user contribution. These steps would inhibit
information flow, progress, and innovation.
Second, most user-generated content is legitimate and socially beneficial.
Users “create positive externalities enjoyed by advertisers, information providers,
merchants, friends, and acquaintances.”338 Yet intermediary liability makes platform
operators internalize the expected harms caused by relatively rare wrongful

333. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 168.
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
336. Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran
v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 606 (2008). By
analogy, “empirical evidence indicates that more than a quarter of [Digital Millennium Copyright Act]
takedown notices are either on shaky legal grounds or address cases in which no copyrights are
violated.” Id. at 605.
337. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 169.
338. Lichtman & Posner, supra note 126, at 225.
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user-contributions, without capturing the full social benefits of their activities.339
This may result in over-deterrence in the form of excessive monitoring and
overzealous censorship by platform operators.340
Third, even if virtual supervisors choose the proper level of care, uncertainties
may arise with respect to the wrongful nature of each contribution. These
uncertainties force virtual supervisors to choose between two types of potential
errors: (1) false negatives, namely, mistaking unlawful publication for lawful; and
(2) false positives, namely, mistaking lawful publications for unlawful.341 A false
negative carries the risks of litigation and liability, whereas a false positive does not.
Acting on a false positive does not seem to have a real cost at all, as removal is
almost costless. This imbalance induces virtual supervisors to remove suspicious yet
lawful speech: to avoid liability, companies would rather err on the side of caution,
and silence speech.342 “In addition, they may be induced to block provocative users,
disable user contributions, or reduce demand for Web 2.0 technologies, thus
impeding progress and innovation.”343
Note further that concurrent liability of the wrongdoer, a real-life supervisor,
and a virtual supervisor, as European Union law currently permits, has two
additional disadvantages. First, to the extent that several parties are at risk of being
liable and that each has a somewhat different perception of what constitutes
wrongdoing, imposing liability on all may restrict freedom of speech more than
singling out one defendant.344 Second, a combination of wrongdoers’, real-life
supervisors’, and virtual supervisors’ liability may result in an aggregation of the
implementation costs of all. Virtual supervisors will be led to monitoring
user-generated content at a high cost that could be saved under an exclusive
real-life supervisors’ liability regime. At the same time, lawsuits will still be brought
against anonymous wrongdoers and real-life supervisors at high administrative costs
that could be saved under an effective virtual supervisors’ liability regime.

339. Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 917–18,
921 (2002).
340. Id. at 917–18. See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow
Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 n.30 (2003) (“ISPs do not fully share the
benefits its subscribers derive from placing material . . . on the network. As a result, imposing liability
on ISPs for subscribers’ infringing material induces ISPs to overdeter, purging any material that a
copyright holder claims is infringing.”).
341. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 169.
342. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Because service
providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for its removal,
they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents
were defamatory or not . . . . Thus, [indirect liability] . . . has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet
speech.”).
343. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 170.
344. The set of statements considered defamatory by either party is the union of the set of
statements considered defamatory by the speaker and the set of statements considered so by the virtual
supervisor, which is equivalent to or larger than each set individually.
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3. Information Without Power
An additional set of problems with virtual supervisors’ liability is a mirror
image of one of the apparent problems with real-life supervisors’ liability. Real-life
supervisors have the skills and ability to affect the child’s conduct but lack the
information necessary for exercising such control. In contrast, virtual supervisors
may have very easy access to the harmful content, which is necessary for preventing
juvenile wrongdoing, but lack the skills and ability to affect the juvenile’s conduct.
Regarding skills, although platforms can use algorithms to identify potentially
harmful statements—the costs of deciding whether these statements are actually
wrongful may be much higher for them than they are for real-life supervisors. The
puerile and often naive nature of juvenile communications, the intricacies and
nuances of specific social interactions and their real-life background, the inability to
discuss content with the child, and the extent of content going through the platform
make virtual supervision inaccurate, with a systematic bias in favor of false positive
findings of wrongfulness. Imposing liability, either under a full-monitoring theory
or a notice-and-takedown model, may result in a severe chilling effect.
As regards ability, three concerns arise. First, each platform has access to
contributions made on its own service. It is incapable of monitoring the user’s
activity on other platforms and in real life or evaluating the cumulative effect of the
user’s contributions and actions on the victim. Second, each platform can respond
to wrongdoing only by restricting the use of its own service. It can prevent, through
screening algorithms, certain kinds of expression, remove tortious material (based
on monitoring or notification), warn users, and even suspend or terminate
recidivists’ accounts, but they cannot do much more than that. Virtual supervisors,
as opposed to real-life supervisors, have no control over the wrongdoer’s actions in
other venues. For example, a social networking platform can remove harmful
content but has nothing to do against recirculation of the same content through
e-mail. Third, a virtual supervisor cannot educate or discipline children and
adolescents, thereby reducing the risk of cyber-harassment in general and the risk
of continued harassment of the specific victim in particular.
D. A Proposed Model for Juvenile Cyber-Wrongdoing
1. Primary Liability Not Useful but Not Barred
The preceding analysis has shown that imposing liability on a juvenile
wrongdoer does not provide the required incentives for harm prevention, because
of minors’ inability to compensate victims, their limited cognitive, emotional, and
social capacity, and the frequent use of anonymity. Children and adolescents can be
incentivized to act properly, but not through civil liability. Supervising and
responding to their conduct is clearly a more effective method for preventing harm.
Supervisors’ liability (direct negligence-based or strict-vicarious) can incentivize
supervisors to take cost-effective measures, and one needs to determine which
supervisor is best equipped to bear this burden.
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Although primary wrongdoers’ liability is economically insufficient, it should
not be barred. First, if the perpetrator is incapable of compensating, comprehending
the wrongfulness of the conduct, or rationally responding to the risks, the victim
will not have an incentive to bring an action anyway. With no prospect of recovery,
either because the defendant is judgment-proof or because of the difficulties in
establishing fault, initiating litigation seems pointless. The ability to pursue a claim
against the primary wrongdoer should be maintained for the rare cases in which
suing is economically reasonable. Inviting courts to decide on a case-by-case basis
if pursuing the claim is economically reasonable would involve high administrative
costs and not provide much greater accuracy than simply relying on victims’
common sense. Second, in some jurisdictions and circumstances, bringing an action
against the juvenile wrongdoer along with a claim against the supervisor may enable
or reduce the costs of administering the latter. For example, if parents’ liability is
vicarious, an action against the child (in addition to a lawsuit against the parents)
may help establish the wrong for which vicarious liability can be imposed. Similarly,
if the wrongdoer is anonymous, imposing liability on the real-life supervisor would
often entail identification of the primary wrongdoer, and this will depend on the
existence of a prima facie cause of action against him or her.345
2. Reducing Information Costs: Basic Models
The cornerstone of the proposed models is a comparison between real-life
and virtual supervisors. While real-life supervisors’ liability can generate the required
incentives to prevent harmful conduct, it raises several questions and concerns. To
begin with, liability must be imposed on the least cost avoider. In the information
age, the choice no longer hinges on time and space. Thus, for example, parents who
buy mobile phones for their children may be better equipped to supervise and
respond to the children’s cyber-activity even during schooltime and on school
premises. More importantly, while real-life supervisors have the ability to educate
and discipline, and even stop concrete incidents of cyberbullying, they do not have
the capacity to monitor children in real time, to overcome children’s concealment
efforts, to cope with the amounts of content produced, and to effortlessly
understand it, and may be further limited by privacy-related constraints. In addition,
if a child commits a wrong anonymously, it will be equally difficult to identify the
real-life supervisor.
Imposing liability on virtual supervisors can generate incentives to prevent
cyber-wrongdoing when primary wrongdoers’ liability fails and save identification
costs in cases of anonymous wrongdoing. However, the cost of accurate supervision
is very high; liability for the negative externalities of operating a platform with no
reward for the positive externalities of such operation generates over-deterrence;
and the asymmetry between the legal outcomes of false negative determinations of
wrongfulness (liability) and false positives (no-liability) encourages silencing in cases
345.

See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
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of uncertainty. Moreover, virtual supervisors may have easy access to the harmful
content, which is necessary for preventing the child’s wrongdoing, but lack the skills
and ability to affect the child’s conduct. They cannot easily determine whether the
publication of a certain item is wrongful (increasing the risk of a chilling effect); they
cannot get the full picture of the juvenile interaction, respond beyond the confines
of the specific platform, and educate or discipline children.
At this stage, let us make two simplifying assumptions, which will be relaxed
in subsequent sections. First, assume that there is only one category of real-life
supervisors, namely parents. Second, assume that the wrongdoer is readily
identifiable. The comparison can now be restated thus: real-life supervisors may
acquire a fuller picture of the interaction and respond in numerous ways to curtail
cyberbullying; but they do not have the capacity to monitor children in real time, to
cope with the amounts of content produced, and to overcome concealment efforts,
and may be further limited by privacy-related constraints. In contrast, virtual
supervisors have easy access to content generated through their own services but
lack the ability to effectively prevent or curtail juvenile misconduct. Even if virtual
supervisors had full access to users’ cyber-activity, an unlikely scenario from
economic and privacy law perspectives, they would be unable to effectively control
cyberbullying. If parents had quick and inexpensive access to a roughly accurate risk
analysis of their children’s cyber-activity, they would not only be cheaper cost
avoiders than any virtual supervisor, but also cost-effective risk avoiders. This
outcome can be pursued in at least two ways.
The first model is algorithmic data collection and analysis by virtual
supervisors and automatic transfers of information about suspected wrongdoing to
users’ parents. Two questions arise at this point: Is this model feasible, and how can
liability rules secure the proper incentives? As regards feasibility, the answer lies in
the technological realm. Each operator of a platform that might be used by children
and adolescents for cyber-wrongdoing can enable designated adults (usually users’
parents) to receive notifications about suspected abuse. This may require
registration, possibly password protected, from within each application used by a
child. Once the parent registers, he or she can be notified about any algorithmically
identified suspicion at a negligible cost. Platform operators would only need to
implement reasonable screening algorithms, as many already do, and leave any
decision regarding the wrongfulness of the conduct and the proper response to
parents, reducing the risk of an industry chilling effect. Presumably, with time,
operating systems installed on devices used by children will further facilitate the
transfer of information by enabling parents to provide their contact information
once, to be shared with all or specifically selected applications.
As regards liability rules, the law first needs to incentivize virtual supervisors
to create a notification system, to collect and analyze relevant information, and to
send notifications when appropriate. A platform operator should thus be held liable
if it does not establish a notification system, does not apply a reasonable monitoring
algorithm, or does not alert the designated adult when the algorithm identifies a
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suspicion. The law also needs to incentivize the parent to verify that all applications
used by the child on a smartphone, a tablet, a laptop, or a desktop designate the
parent as the person to be notified in case of abuse. A parent should be held liable
for cyber-wrongdoing by his or her child when the parent did not opt-in to the
notification service of the application used for the particular wrongdoing or failed
to take reasonable measures to address suspected misconduct when notified. If
parents are liable for failing to opt in, operating system developers will be
incentivized to provide a tool for reducing the hassle and risk of parental default to
make their product attractive for customers. The development of an operating
system feature, enabling parents to provide their contact information only once, will
probably occur without further legal intervention.
The main problem with the first model is that it is platform specific. Parents
would be unable to monitor activity on applications used only on devices beyond
their control, such as school desktop computers. More importantly, while parents
will be alerted about their children’s abuse of native applications, such as Facebook
or WhatsApp, they would have no control over cyber-wrongdoing through web
applications, such as posts and comments on blogs and online forums,346 online
reader responses, or webmail. A related but easily soluble problem is that parents
would be unable to supervise the child’s activity on a specific platform before
realizing that the child is actually using it and requesting notification of abuse,
especially if the child removes the application or closes the browser window
immediately after the abuse. The operating system feature described above can solve
this problem by automatically linking any new application to the parents’ contact
information. Lastly, platform-specific models might be deficient to the extent that
platform operators have no presence in the relevant jurisdiction. If liability is
practically unenforceable, it has no deterrent effect.
The second model hinges on the use of data collection and analysis tools by
the parents to reduce their own information costs. The same two questions
arise: Is this model feasible, and how can liability rules secure the proper incentives?
Parental cyber-surveillance tools are already available. Parents can obtain full access
to the child’s browser history, e-mails, social networking activity, instant messaging,
text messaging, and the like, through special surveillance applications and services,
such as Monqi, mSpy, Spyzie, and TeenSafe. Surveillance tools seemingly suffer
from two major weaknesses. First, although they provide access to information,
parents still need to review a large quantity of content, taking different forms,
continuously created on various platforms, not only by the specific child but also
by his or her peers. Parents do not have the time and energy to carry out this task.
Second, many parents would not want to so blatantly invade their child’s privacy
and so strictly limit his or her autonomy. Presumably, these two problems can be
solved with algorithmic data collection and analysis. Instead of perusing all content,

346. As in the case of D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, rev. denied, No. S181558, 2010
Cal. LEXIS 6052 ( June 17, 2010).
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which is both impractical and disrespectful of the child’s privacy, parents would
seek to rely on algorithmic tools, which would analyze all data and inform them of
dubious activity that requires additional scrutiny. Surveillance applications already
offer keyword and illicit content alerts, and application vendors can gradually
develop and offer more complex data analysis and notification features. Replacing
full human monitoring with algorithmic data collection and analysis tools will reduce
parents’ information costs and parent-child friction over infringement of privacy.
This is also preferable to notifications following data collection and analysis by
individual platforms, which only access fragments of the full picture. Of course, if
parents use these tools, there is no need for direct communication between
platforms and parents with respect to possible abuse of these platforms on
monitored devices.
Parents may have a sufficiently strong incentive to use advanced surveillance
applications to protect their own children. Many parents already do, and this is
encouraged by experts in various disciplines.347 In theory, legal incentives to acquire
and employ these tools may be redundant. However, given the cost of using these
applications, which may include a nontrivial price tag as well as parental time and
energy, parents’ overconfidence in their children’s virtue, and the common
reluctance to constrain privacy, internalization of the expected costs to others of
the child’s activity may be necessary. To incentivize parents to reasonably use
advanced surveillance applications, the law should impose liability when failure to
employ such tools results in juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, in addition to standard
liability for not taking reasonable precautions upon learning about the risk. The
remaining question is what would incentivize vendors to develop and offer
advanced data collection and analysis features. If parents could be held liable for
failing to efficiently monitor their children’s cyber-activity, they would be willing to
pay a certain premium for features that ease detection of cyber-wrongdoing, thereby
reducing the cost of monitoring and the risk of liability. Parents’ willingness to pay
will create incentives for competing application vendors.
The main problem with the second model is that it is device specific. While
parents will obtain information about their children’s abuse of a specific device
under surveillance, they will have no control over cyber-activity on other devices,
such as school or library computers. The likelihood of ongoing abuse through
devices that the parents cannot access is not very high, but this possibility should
not be ignored. The next Section will address this concern. Furthermore, using

347. See, e.g., Meltem Dinleyci et al., Media Use by Children, and Parents’ Views on Children’s
Media Usage, 5 INTERACTIVE J. MED. RES. e18 (2016) (“Encouraging parents to monitor children’s
media carefully can have a wide range of health benefits for children.”); Douglas A. Gentile et al.,
Protective Effects of Parental Monitoring of Children’s Media Use: A Prospective Study, 168 JAMA
PEDIATRICS 479, 480 (2014) (“Many negative effects of both the amount and content of media may be
mitigated by parental monitoring of children’s media use.”); Dick Uliano, Police: Parents Need to Monitor
Kids’
Cellphone
Use, WTOP (Nov. 21, 2017, 8:09 PM), https://wtop.com/
local/2017/11/police-parents-need-monitor-kids-cellphone-use/ [ https://perma.cc/X6UU-LK99 ].
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advanced surveillance applications currently involves a real outlay for the parents
(in the form of monthly service fees), as opposed to the first model which has no
direct monetary cost for them. Holding parents negligent for failing to take the more
costly measure may not be defensible given its limited and speculative marginal
benefit: the added ability to oversee the use of web applications on
parent-controlled devices minus the lost ability to oversee the use of supervised
applications on third-party devices.348

Apps under parents’ control
Apps not under parents’ control

Device under
parents’ control
Model 1, Model 2
Model 2

Device not under
parents’ control
Model 1
Neither

Table 1. Coverage by Proposed Models
3. Relaxing the First Assumption
The previous Section made two simplifying assumptions: (1) there is only one
category of real-life supervisors, and (2) the wrongdoer is readily identifiable. These
assumptions will now be relaxed in turn. The first inquiry, then, is how the
preceding analysis must change if there is more than one category of real-life
supervisors, for example, parents and school personnel. The first model proposed
for reducing the cost of monitoring children’s cyber-activity is platform specific. It
will keep parents informed about their children’s activity on some applications
regardless of time and space constraints. The parent will receive notifications of
abuse through various platforms, even if the child accesses these platforms on
devices beyond the parent’s reach. However, parents will not obtain information
about cyber-wrongdoing through unsupervised communication methods, such as
webmail, or any communication method used solely on devices beyond their reach.
If this model is adopted, the legal system must incentivize those who can acquire
such information to do so and respond reasonably.
Regardless of the specific technological tool used to reduce data collection and
analysis costs, any institution allowing many children to access cyberspace through
its electronic equipment must require individual identification. In the case of
cyber-wrongdoing, the source of the content will be detectable. If the institution
fails to enforce individual identification, it must be held liable for any
cyber-wrongdoing perpetrated by unidentified users through its equipment.
Now, reducing information costs concerning cyber-activity beyond the
parents’ control may take several forms. To begin with, a school representative can
serve as the designated adult for receiving notifications about students’ abuse of
348. From an aggregate welfare perspective, developing platform-specific data collection and
analysis tools may be more costly than developing advanced parental surveillance tools. Nevertheless,
platform operators may ultimately use less costly off-the-shelf software and services based on the same
technologies used by parental surveillance applications.
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applications on school computers, unless parents have already assumed this role for
the specific applications. Upon notification, the school can endeavor to stop the
wrongdoing, inter alia, by informing the wrongdoer’s parents. In addition to
incentivizing virtual supervisors to establish algorithmic data analysis and
notification systems, as explained above,349 the law will need to incentivize schools
to obtain the necessary information from platforms used on school devices. They
should be held liable for cyber-wrongdoing by students if they did not opt in to the
notification service of the abused application (unless the parents are already the
designated adults) or failed to take reasonable measures to address suspected
wrongdoing when notified. This combination of platform-specific data analysis and
notification systems will cover any abuse of native applications. Nonetheless, it has
two weaknesses. First, it keeps all activity through web applications covert. Second,
granting schools access to students’ cyber-activity outside of school is
legally problematic.350
Alternatively, owners or operators of devices accessible by children can be
incentivized to employ user-specific surveillance tools, such as Securly, by holding
them liable for any cyber-wrongdoing resulting from failing to do so. They should
also be liable if the surveillance application notified them of possible wrongdoing,
and they failed to take reasonable measures to prevent harm.351 Informing the
parents, who may have a fuller knowledge and understanding of the situation, and
obtaining their feedback, is a necessary step in devising the proper response. While
schools may be constrained in searching students’ personal devices, there does not
seem to be a substantive legal obstacle to monitoring school devices.352 The
problems with this model are that it does not cover abuse of web applications on
parent-controlled devices and involves wasteful double scrutiny of cyber-activity on
school devices through parentally-monitored applications.
The second model proposed for reducing the cost of parental monitoring of
children’s cyber-activity is device specific. Parents using surveillance applications
gain access to the child’s cyber-activity only through devices under the parents’
control. Parents are unable to monitor any activity on “external” devices, even if the
child uses platforms that are also installed on devices with parental surveillance.
Requiring owners or operators of devices accessible by children to request user
identification and employ user-specific surveillance tools may solve the problem. If
the surveillance application notifies the device owner of a potential misdeed, the
owner can immediately respond. Frequently, informing the child’s parents may be
349. See supra Section II.D.2.
350. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text.
351. Theoretically, schools can prohibit or block any use of potentially harmful applications on
school computers. This will protect the school from liability for students’ abuse of its equipment, but
cannot be legally required. It is unjustified economically and pedagogically but within
school prerogative.
352. See Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School
Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 63, 70–87, 119 (2014)
(discussing the different levels of school surveillance authority).
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a reasonable response. The parents, after receiving all relevant information, are
expected to take reasonable measures to prevent harm. This combination of devicespecific data collection and analysis tools is the most comprehensive method for
reducing information costs, as it covers all applications on all devices. Channeling
all information to the parents enables the least cost avoiders to assess the risks and
take cost-effective measures to reduce them.

Apps under parents’ control

Device under
parents’ control
Model 1, Model 2

Apps not under parents’ control

Model 2

Device not under
parents’ control
Model 1, School
monitoring
School monitoring

Table 2. Coverage with More Than One Supervisor
4. Relaxing the Second Assumption
An additional complication arises in the case of anonymous
cyber-wrongdoing. Courts cannot impose liability on an unidentified party, and if
the juvenile cyber-wrongdoer is anonymous, his or her real-life supervisors will
usually be unknown. One option is to foreclose virtual supervisors’ liability but
enable courts to order cyber service providers to disclose information about
anonymous wrongdoers and their real-life supervisors (the American model).353 Yet
the costs of identifying an anonymous wrongdoer might be prohibitively high, and
imposing liability on real-life supervisors would not normally reduce these costs.354
A second option is to impose strict or negligence-based liability on virtual
supervisors for abuse of their platforms while preventing identification of
anonymous users (the Israeli model).355 This saves identification costs when the
wrongdoer is anonymous but entails high monitoring and error costs as discussed
above.356 A third option is to simultaneously enable identification of anonymous
wrongdoers and recognize virtual supervisors’ liability (the European model).357
However, to the extent that two or more parties may be liable and that each has a
different perception of what constitutes wrongdoing, imposing liability on all may
restrict freedom of speech more than singling out one defendant.358 Moreover,
concurrent liability of real-life and virtual supervisors may result in an aggregation
of the implementation costs of the two regimes. Virtual supervisors will be led to
monitor user-generated content at a high cost that could be saved under an exclusive
real-life supervisors’ liability regime. At the same time, lawsuits will be brought

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 163–65, 175.
See supra Sections II.A.4, II.B.3.
Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 167–68, 175.
See supra Section II.C.2.
Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 170–71, 175.
See supra note 346.
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against anonymous wrongdoers and real-life supervisors at high administrative costs
that could be saved under an effective virtual supervisors’ liability regime.
The fourth option is the most efficient adjustment to the basic liability
model: it minimizes identification costs and facilitates parental liability while saving
virtual supervisors’ monitoring and error costs. This adjustment is based on the
English defamation model, whereby the cyber-wrongdoer is exclusively liable, but
if he or she is not reasonably reachable, the platform operator may become liable.
The virtual supervisor is liable if the victim has insufficient information to identify
the wrongdoer, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the virtual supervisor
did not properly respond.359 A proper response requires obtaining the wrongdoer’s
contact information and providing it to the victim or removing the wrongful
content.360 Under this “residual liability” regime, virtual supervisors can avoid
liability and monitoring altogether by (1) obtaining user identification data, at least
when a content analysis algorithm identifies suspected cyber-wrongdoing, or
(2) removing content generated by unreachable users on notification of its harmful
potential. This will save all monitoring costs and prevent over-deterrence caused by
non-internalization of the economic benefits of Web 2.0 technologies and by the
asymmetric legal response to judgment errors. Additionally, by incentivizing virtual
supervisors to take measures to reduce the cost of identifying anonymous
wrongdoers, this method will facilitate parental liability which induces efficient
parental supervision. Theoretically, if virtual supervisors under a residual liability
regime allow postings by unreachable wrongdoers, they might still need to monitor
to avoid liability. Even so, monitoring will be limited to content generated by
unidentifiable users, so the cost will be much lower than in the case of liability for
any abuse. Presumably, virtual supervisors will allow anonymous contributions only
if the benefit (for instance, increasing traffic) exceeds the costs.
CONCLUSION
Cyberbullying has become a notorious epidemic, culminating in widely
publicized suicides.361 Whether a new and distinct problem or an old one in a new
guise,362 the technological setting has undoubtedly generated new challenges and, at
the same time, new opportunities for legal response. This Article provides
systematic legal and economic analyses of an underexplored regulatory tool: civil
liability. The analysis on both levels is based on a trichotomy of potential
defendants—primary wrongdoers, real-life supervisors, and virtual supervisors.
Part I discussed applicable law with a comparative touch. Section A examined
common law causes of action that can be used in lawsuits against primary
359.
360.
361.
362.

Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 5(3)–(4) (U.K.).
Id. § 5(3)(c), (5).
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
See Dieter Wolke et al., Cyberbullying: A Storm in a Teacup?, 26 EUR. CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 899 (2017) (finding that cyberbullying neither increases the number of
bullying victims significantly nor exacerbates the psychological and psychosocial impact of bullying).
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wrongdoers, including an independent tort of cyberbullying, defamation, invasion
of privacy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the prima
facie tort. It pinpointed possible difficulties in establishing these causes of action
and, more generally, in pursuing claims against tech-savvy minors
—age-related legal constraints, anonymity, and low expected recovery. Section B
turned to the two main categories of real-life supervisors: parents and schools. It
examined several theories of parental liability, including negligent entrustment of a
dangerous instrument, negligent supervision, and negligent enabling of a tort, and
identified their particular limits along with the general difficulty associated with
anonymous misconduct. Section B then analyzed common law and statutory bases
of school and school personnel liability, including negligent supervision, § 1983, and
Title VI, and explained that such liability is subject to constitutional and legal
constraints on school regulation of student speech and off-campus activity. Section
C showed that under American law, virtual supervisors are immune from liability
for wrongful user-contributions. It presented the European Union framework and
the English model, as well as local calls for reform.
Part II evaluated the different regimes from an economic perspective and laid
the foundations for a technology-powered model. Section A explained that primary
wrongdoers’ liability cannot achieve efficient deterrence because of minors’ inability
to compensate victims, limited cognitive, emotional, and social capacity, and
frequent use of anonymity. Section B discussed real-life supervisors, focusing on
the gap between their considerable power to affect supervised children’s conduct
and the high cost of information necessary for exercising that power. Section C
showed that virtual supervisors’ liability may be inefficient due to the high cost of
monitoring, non-internalization of the economic benefits of the participatory web
by service providers, and an asymmetry between false negative and false positive
determinations of wrongfulness. Additionally, it argued that virtual supervisors can
easily access relevant information but lack the power to affect juvenile conduct.
Lastly, Section D constructed an efficiency-oriented model which integrates
technological tools to reduce information costs. First, primary tortfeasors’ liability
is economically insufficient, but should not be barred. Second, to incentivize
parents to reasonably use advanced surveillance applications, the law should impose
liability when failure to employ such tools results in juvenile
cyber-wrongdoing, in addition to standard liability for not taking reasonable
precautions upon learning about the risk. Third, schools should be liable for
cyberbullying through school devices if they failed to (1) enforce reliable
identification of users, (2) employ advanced surveillance tools, or (3) take
reasonable measures to prevent harm upon notification of possible misconduct.
Fourth, a virtual supervisor is liable if the victim has insufficient information to
identify the wrongdoer, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the virtual
supervisor did not properly respond.
Reports on the high prevalence of cyberbullying, together with rare but salient
deaths, have led legislators, policymakers, and academics to an understandable
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pursuit of appropriate solutions. Regrettably, while delegation of power to
educational institutions and criminalization of cyber-misconduct are relatively
common, at least in public discourse, the potential impact of civil liability has been
downplayed. This Article has put it under the spotlight, without contesting the
possible need for a more comprehensive framework.

